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This work consists of three essays that investigate the effect of investor behavior on 
asset prices.  In the first essay, titled “Transaction Costs and Investment Decisions of 
Individual Investors,” I study the liquidity decisions of 66,000 households from a large 
discount brokerage.  My paper provides an empirical link between investors’ optimal 
trading decisions and the liquidity premium observed in the market.  In particular, I show 
that transaction costs are an important determinant of investors’ holding periods which 
determine how transaction costs are amortized and priced in asset returns.  I also show 
that there is correlation in the demand for liquid assets across households, and consistent 
with the notion of flight to liquidity, this demand increases during times of low market 
liquidity.  Households with higher incomes and with higher wealth invested in the stock 
market supply liquidity when market liquidity is low. 
The second essay, “Is there a Distress Risk Anomaly? Bond Spreads as a Proxy for 
Default Risk,” investigates the pricing of default risk in stock returns.  The results show 
that credit spreads predict corporate defaults better than previously used measures, such 
as, bond ratings, accounting variables and structural model parameters.  Contrary to 
previous findings, using corporate credit spreads to proxy for default risk, this study finds 
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no significant pricing of default risk in the cross-section of equity returns.  Exposure 
to market volatility innovations is shown to explain much of the returns to distressed 
stocks previously documented. 
The final essay, “Affect in a Behavioral Asset Pricing Model”, investigates 
the role of psychological heuristic Affect in asset pricing.  The paper outlines a 
behavioral asset pricing model where expected returns are high when objective 
risk is high and also when subjective risk is high. High subjective risk comes with 
negative affect. Investors prefer stocks with positive affect and their preference 
boosts the prices of such stocks and depresses their returns.  Empirical support for 
the model is provided by studying the preferences of investors as reflected in 
surveys conducted by Fortune magazine during 1983- 2006. The returns of 
admired stocks, those highly rated by the Fortune respondents, were lower than 
the returns of despised stocks, those rated low. This is consistent with the 
hypothesis that stocks with negative affect have high subjective risk and their 
extra returns compensate for that risk. 
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Chapter II 
 
Transaction Costs and Investment Decisions of 
 Individual Investors 
 
 
Theoretical papers link the liquidity premium to the optimal trading decisions of 
investors facing transaction costs.  The frequency with which investors trade illiquid 
securities subject to high transaction costs determine the holding period over which these 
transaction costs are amortized.  If investors drastically reduce their trading of illiquid 
securities (Vayanos 1998, Constantinides 1988, Heaton and Lucas 1996) then amortized 
transaction costs will be low and investors will demand only a small liquidity premium to 
hold illiquid assets.  If, on the other hand, investors have frequent trading needs because 
of income shocks (Lynch and Tan 2007), exogenous liquidity shocks (Huang 2003), or 
because they need to hedge non-traded risk exposure (Lo, Mamaysky and Wang 2004), 
then the resulting liquidity premium can be quite large. 
Even though it is investors’ trading decisions that provide the link between 
transaction costs and the liquidity premium on securities, lack of data on actual trades has 
made it difficult to empirically examine how investors behave in the presence of 
transaction costs.  Using a unique dataset, this paper investigates the liquidity decisions 
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of 66,000 households from a large discount brokerage who make over two million trades 
over a six-year time period.  The focus of this paper is threefold.  First, I examine 
empirically the relationship between investors’ holding periods and the transaction costs 
of securities they trade and hold in their portfolios.  Second, I investigate the impact of 
these liquidity decisions on investment performance.  Finally, I examine the systemic 
decisions of households as a group over time.  This paper differs from other empirical 
papers in this literature in that the focus is on investor (as opposed to stock) behavior. 
I find that transaction costs play an important role in households’ trading and 
investment decisions.  Transaction costs are an important determinant of holding periods 
of investors after controlling various household and stock characteristics.  However, the 
effect of transaction costs on holding periods is much less than the effect predicted in the 
models of Vayanos (1998) and Constantinides (1988).  The results in this paper offer an 
explanation for the discrepancy between empirically observed liquidity premium and the 
one predicted by these models in which the holding period is endogenously determined.1  
I find that there are differences across households in how much attention they pay to the 
liquidity of the securities they trade and hold in their portfolios.  Investors who are more 
sophisticated tend to pay more attention to liquidity and have holding periods that are 
strongly correlated with measures of transaction costs.  
There are important implications of households’ liquidity decisions for investment 
performance.  I find that households with longer holding periods earn returns net of 
amortized transaction costs that are greater than the net returns of households with shorter 
holding periods.  These results are consistent with Amihud and Mendelson (1986), who 
                                                 
1 For empirical studies, see, for instance, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
Amihud (2002), and Amihud and Mendelson (1986). 
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postulate that investors with longer holding periods earn rents for holding illiquid 
securities that exceed amortized transaction costs, which drive the liquidity premium in 
their model.  Consistent with the notion that sophisticated investors pay closer attention 
to liquidity, I find that households whose holding periods are negatively correlated with 
transaction costs, that is, households that do not pay attention to liquidity, earn lower 
gross and net returns.   
Households tend to demand liquid securities in tandem.  That is, there is systemic 
variation in the demand for liquid assets across households.  Consistent with the notion of 
flight to liquidity, the demand for liquid assets goes up during times of low aggregate 
market liquidity with households buying liquid securities and selling illiquid securities.  
However, there is a subset of investors with deep pockets, those with higher incomes and 
higher levels of wealth, who buy illiquid securities when there is a negative liquidity 
shock and earn a premium in the process. 
How investors make decisions in the presence of transaction costs is important not 
only to better understand how liquidity is priced in the financial markets, but it also has 
implications for investor welfare and public policy.  This paper shows that expected 
holding periods and amortized transaction costs strongly impact the performance of 
household portfolios.  Investment advisors should consider the expected holding period 
of investors when recommending illiquid stocks to their clients. The results in this paper 
also have implications for the efficacy of a securities transaction tax.  Such a tax has been 
proposed to reduce excess speculation in order to reduce volatility and the influence of 
short-term investors on management (Stiglitz 1989, Tobin 1984, Summers and Summers 
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1990). This paper provides an empirical link between the magnitude of such a tax and its 
impact on trading frequency of retail traders.   
This paper is also related to investor rationality and the increasingly popular notion 
that individual investors overtrade and lose substantial amounts to trading costs without 
any gain in performance.2  Usually a behavioral bias, such as overconfidence, is proposed 
as an explanation for excessive trading by individual investors who tend to ignore 
transaction costs.  Barber Odean and Zheng (2005), for instance, show that investors pay 
attention only to the salient costs of mutual funds, but ignore hidden operating costs.  The 
findings in this paper suggest that most investors are, to a large extent, cognizant of 
transaction costs when making trading decisions, and investors who trade more 
frequently pay greater attention to the liquidity of the underlying stocks they trade.  A 
number of papers also document that a subset of retail investors displays financial 
sophistication and market understanding and earns abnormal returns.3  In this paper, I 
show that sophisticated households are more likely to hold illiquid stocks over a longer 
time period and earn greater net returns as a result. 
In a related paper, Atkins and Dyl (1997) study the relationship between turnover and 
bid-ask spreads for Nasdaq and NYSE stocks.  They find a positive relationship between 
bid-ask spreads and holding periods, which they proxy with turnover.  There are, 
however, two problems with using aggregate turnover to proxy for holding periods.  First, 
aggregate turnover is an average across many investors and can be highly skewed in a 
market where a handful of investors trade to provide liquidity.  Second, and more 
                                                 
2 Barber and Odean (2000) show that investors similarly ranked in terms of portfolio turnover have similar 
gross returns, but substantially different net returns after accounting for transaction costs.  Barber et al. 
(2008), using a complete transaction history of all investors in Taiwan, find that individual investor losses 
equal 2.2 % of GDP, and that such loses are mainly due to transaction costs. 
3 See the discussion in Section 2. 
  7 
importantly, holding periods are based on trading decisions of investors, who consider 
ex-ante transaction costs of the underlying securities.  Another closely-related paper 
(Naes and Odegaard 2008) uses transaction-level Norwegian data to show that turnover is 
indeed a poor proxy for actual holding periods of investors.4  Their focus is on asset 
pricing, and they show that turnover is priced in size-sorted portfolios while average 
holding period is not.   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  The next section describes the 
empirical questions pursued in this paper.  Section 2.2 describes the liquidity measures 
and the individual trade data used herein.   Sections 2.3 to 2.5 present and discuss the 
main findings, and Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.1 Hypotheses and Related Literature 
Although empirical studies document that effects of transaction costs on asset prices 
are both statistically and economically significant, there is a debate in the theoretical 
literature as to the direction and the magnitude of this relationship. 5  The debate centers 
on how investors make optimal trading decisions in the presence of transaction costs.  
The basic premise that the rate of return on a security should incorporate transaction costs 
is straightforward and uncontroversial.  An investor who buys a security and expects to 
pay transaction costs when selling it will take this into account in valuing that security.  
An investor’s required return on a stock will equal her required return in the absence of 
transaction costs plus these costs amortized over the investor’s expected holding period.  
                                                 
4 This research was conducted concurrently. 
5 For empirical studies, see, for instance, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), 
Amihud (2002), Chordia et al. (2000, 2001), Hasbrouck and Seppi (2001), and Huberman and Halka 
(1999). 
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The liquidity premium required by investors to hold illiquid securities thus depends 
strongly on investors’ holding periods.  The theoretical debate over the effect of 
transaction costs on asset prices arises primarily from differences in how investors’ 
holding periods are modeled. 
One of the earlier papers to incorporate investors’ holding periods into asset pricing 
with market frictions is Amihud and Mendelson (1986).  They develop a model where 
risk neutral investors with different exogenous holding periods and limited capital trade 
securities subject to fixed transaction costs.  Amihud and Mendelson show that 
transaction costs cause a clientele effect, whereby investors with longer holding periods 
select to hold stocks with higher transaction costs in equilibrium.  These liquidity 
clienteles drive how transaction costs are priced in asset returns.   
The static model with exogenous holding periods has been extended to incorporate 
dynamic decisions of investors.  In models where the holding period decision is 
determined endogenously (Constantinides 1986, Vayanos 1998, Vayanos and Vila 1999, 
Heaton and Lucas 1996), the resulting liquidity premium is much lower.  In these models, 
the marginal utility from trading is low and investors respond to transaction costs by 
turning over their portfolio less frequently.  These models predict a liquidity premium on 
asset prices that is a magnitude smaller than transaction costs, but they also predict 
unrealistically low levels of trading activity and volume.  In models where investors are 
forced to trade frequently (Huang 2003, Lynch and Tan 2007, Lo, Mamaysky and Wang 
2006) the resulting liquidity premium can be large. 
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In all these models it is the magnitude of the relationship between holding periods and 
transaction costs that determines the liquidity premium in the market.6  Using individual 
trade data, I test for the relationship between holding periods and transaction costs after 
controlling for a number of investor and stock characteristics.  The first hypothesis is 
thus: 
     
H1a:  Holding periods are positively related to measures of fixed transaction costs after 
controlling for investor and stock characteristics. 
 
In testing the relationship between holding periods and transaction costs, I control for a 
number of investor and stock characteristics.  I also control for the well known behavioral 
tendency to hang on to losing stocks too long and to sell winning stocks too quickly (the 
disposition effect), and the level of information asymmetry for a given stock.7  I repeat 
the same analysis using portfolios instead of transactions.  That is, I examine the 
relationship between households’ overall portfolio liquidity and their average holding 
period.  I also analyze the magnitude of the impact of transaction costs on holding 
periods, and compare the results to calibrated values in the models of Vayanos (1998), 
Constantinides (1986) and Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2005). 
Previous studies have shown that, on average, households’ stock investments perform 
poorly.  Odean (1999), for instance, reports that individual investors’ purchases under-
                                                 
6 Although in this paper I only focus on a subset of investors in the market, namely retail investors, a 
number of papers have shown that correlated trading by retail investors impact returns (Kumar and Lee 
2006, Barber, Odean and Zhu 2006, and Hvidkjaer 2008). 
7 Asymmetric information is also considered part of transaction costs.  See discussion in Section 4. 
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perform their sales by a significant margin.8  However, other studies have concluded that 
there exists a subset of retail investors who display financial sophistication and market 
understanding.  For instance, Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway (2005) document strong 
persistence in the performance of individual investors’ trades, suggesting that some 
skillful individual investors might be able to earn abnormal profits. Using the same 
dataset in this paper, Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) find that the level of portfolio 
diversification is related to investor sophistication.  Feng and Seasholes (2005) find that 
investor sophistication reduces a well known behavioral bias, the disposition effect.  
Given that previous studies have documented heterogeneity in the performance and the 
investment decisions of individual investors, we should expect similar cross-sectional 
differences in the correlation between holding periods and transaction costs across 
investors in the dataset.  Furthermore, we should expect this correlation to increase with 
investor sophistication and experience:   
 
H1b:  The correlation between holding periods and transactions costs is higher for 
sophisticated investors. 
  
I assume, as in Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), that the level of financial sophistication is 
correlated with education and resources available to an investor.  I use income, wealth 
invested in the stock market and the occupation of the investor to proxy for financial 
sophistication.  I also use information contained in investors’ trades.  I assume that 
                                                 
8 Barber and Odean (2000, 2001), using the same dataset in this paper, further show that investors lose 
substantial amounts to trading costs without any additional gain in performance, consistent with the 
hypothesis that individual investors are overconfident and tend to trade excessively.   
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investors who engage in short selling, who trade options or who trade foreign securities 
are likely to be more sophisticated than the average investor.     
The second empirical question I address in this paper is how holding periods and 
transaction costs impact investment performance.  In the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) 
model, it is the rents earned by investors with longer holding periods that drive the 
liquidity premium.  Security prices reflect the marginal investor’s holding period, and 
have to fall by the present value of transaction costs to induce the marginal investor to 
buy the security.9  The price for the security with the lowest transaction cost, for instance, 
is set such that the investor with the shortest holding period is indifferent between 
investing in that security and the one with no transaction costs.  Investors with longer 
holding periods earn a premium (rents) when investing in that security because their 
amortized transaction costs are lower, which imply: 
  
H2a:  Investors with longer holding periods earn returns net of amortized transaction 
costs that exceed net returns of investors with shorter holding periods. 
  
The correlation between holding periods and transaction costs is likely to impact 
portfolio performance on both a gross and a net basis.  Households that do not pay 
attention to transaction costs when they trade are likely to have lower net returns due to 
transaction costs.  As mentioned earlier, previous studies have shown investor 
sophistication to be correlated with higher portfolio performance and lower levels of 
behavioral biases.  A negative correlation between holding periods and transaction costs 
                                                 
9 Vayanos and Vila (1997) show a similar result when securities are identical except for transaction costs. 
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could, therefore, also indicate lack of financial sophistication and market knowledge, 
which is associated with lower gross returns: 
 
H2b:  Investors whose holding periods are negatively related to transaction costs earn 
lower gross and net returns.  
 
In other words, we would expect investors who do not pay attention to liquidity to make 
other trading mistakes which result in them having lower gross returns.   
Previous studies have shown that there is a common time varying component to 
liquidity across stocks (Chordia et al 2000, Hasbrouck and Seppi 2001, and Huberman 
and Halka 2001).  Other studies have shown that this common component is priced in 
stock returns (Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen 2005, Korajczyk and 
Sadka 2008).  It is not clear, however, as to what causes this common variation.  
Commonality in liquidity can arise from the supply side, if there is systemic variation in 
the costs of providing liquidity.10  Commonality can also arise from the demand side, if a 
common factor such as volatility or uncertainty causes a systemic variation in the demand 
for liquidity.11  Even with constant exogenous transaction costs, a time-varying liquidity 
premia can arise as investors’ willingness to bear these costs changes over time.  Vayanos 
(2004), for instance, develops a model with fixed transaction costs in which changes in 
market volatility affect systemic liquidity by creating correlated trading patterns among 
                                                 
10 Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2000)  find some evidence of asymmetric information and inventory 
risk affecting the common component of liquidity.  Comerton-Forde et al (2008) and Coughenour and Saad 
(2004), examining liquidity of stocks at NYSE overseen by the same specialist, provide some support for 
the supply side view.  Huberman and Halka (2001), on the other hand, after failing to find inventory cost or 
asymmetric information based explanations for the systemic component of liquidity, conjecture that 
commonality emerges due to noise traders. 
11 Chordia et al. 2001 shows that trading activity covaries with liquidity. 
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investors.  By examining the actual trades of investors, I can test whether there is 
systemic variation in the demand for liquid assets and whether liquidity shocks apply (or 
transmitted) systemically across investors that can potentially cause market-wide effects: 
 
H3a:  There is systemic variation in households’ demand for liquid stocks. 
 
In order to test whether there is systemic variation in the demand for liquidity, I employ a 
similar methodology used in Kumar and Lee (2006) and Barber, Odean and Zhu (2003), 
who investigate systemic correlation in the trades of individual investors.  I test whether 
randomly selected non-overlapping groups of investors tilt their portfolios towards liquid 
assets at the same time.   
If there is systemic variation in demand for liquid assets across investors, it is 
important to examine how this systemic demand varies over time with changes in 
aggregate level of market liquidity.  If investors demand liquid securities at the same time 
when aggregate liquidity is low, the liquidity premium required to hold illiquid securities 
would be high. The literature, to a large extent, treats individual investors as noise traders 
providing constant liquidity to the market.  Kaniel, Saar, and Titman (2006), Campbell, 
Ramadorai, and Schwartz (2007), Stoffman (2008), and Griffin et al. (2003), 
investigating institutional and retail trades, provide evidence consistent with retail traders 
providing liquidity to meet institutional demand for immediacy.  These studies, however, 
investigate short term returns to institutional and individual buy/sell imbalances, and do 
not consider the liquidity level of the market or the liquidity level of the individual 
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securities that are traded.12  With individual trade data, I can examine the liquidity level 
of the securities bought and sold by individual investors, and examine whether there is a 
flight to liquidity among households, and test if households are net demanders or 
suppliers of liquid securities when aggregate market liquidity is low: 
 
H3b:  Households are net demanders of liquid stocks when the market level of liquidity is 
low. 
 
The recent Goldman Sachs’ agreement to sell $5 billion of perpetual preferred stock 
to Berkshire Hathaway illustrates both the adverse effects of market participants seeking 
liquidity at the same time and the importance of external investors with deep pockets as 
liquidity providers. There are likely to be cross-sectional differences in trading patterns in 
response to aggregate liquidity shocks.  Investors with deep pockets can take advantage 
of investment opportunities during turbulent markets.  We can expect households with 
higher wealth/income levels to buy illiquid assets that have dropped in price: 
 
H3c:  Households with higher income and wealth levels are net suppliers of illiquid 
stocks when aggregate market liquidity is low.  
 
To test the above hypothesis, I construct an aggregate market liquidity measure as in 
Acharya and Pedersen (2005) and Amihud (2002), and compare the liquidity levels of 
purchases and sales of stocks by households under different liquidity regimes.  I use a 
                                                 
12 In most of these studies, investors can not be identified and their transactions can not be tracked over 
time.  
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regression framework to test the effect of investor characteristics, such as income and 
wealth, on the demand for liquid securities. 
 
2.2 Individual Trade Data and Liquidity Measures 
The main dataset for this paper comes from a major U.S. discount brokerage house 
and includes the daily trading records of 78,000 households from January 1991 to 
December 1996.  These households hold a total of 158,034 accounts of various types 
including cash, margin, IRA and Keogh.  In this study, I focus on the common stock 
investments of the households, which constitute nearly two-thirds of the total value of 
their investments in the dataset.  About 66,000 of the 78,000 households trade common 
stock, making close to two million trades over the sample period. The transaction record 
includes number of shares traded, price and any commissions paid.  The dataset also 
includes each household’s month-end positions including the value of security holdings 
at market close on the statement date.  For a sub-sample of households, the dataset 
includes demographic information, such as income, age, gender, occupation and marital 
status.  A more detailed explanation of the dataset can be found in Barber and Odean 
(2000, 2001).  A comparison of this dataset with Survey of Consumer Finances, IRS and 
TAQ data has shown it to be representative of U.S. individual investors (Ivkovic, Sialm, 
and Weisbenner 2006, Ivkovic, Poterba, and Weisbenner 2005, and Barber, Odean, and 
Zhu 2006).   
Liquidity is a multi-dimensional concept, and is usually defined in terms of the costs 
and risks associated with transacting financial securities.  These costs relate to exogenous 
costs of transacting including price impact, asymmetric information and inventory risk.  
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Given the multi-dimensional and unobservable nature of liquidity, I use a number of 
different measures that have been previously utilized in the literature.  The first is a 
Bayesian version of the Roll (1984) transaction cost measure:  
 
 , , 1 , , 1
,
cov( , )   if cov( , ) 0;
 0                     otherwise.
i t i t i t i t
i t
r r r r
c − −
 − <= 

 (2.1) 
   
It is based on the model 
, , , ,i t i t i t i t
r c q ε= ∆ +  where 
,i t
q  is a trade direction indicator, 
,i t
c  
is the transaction cost measure and 
,i t
ε  is an error term for stock i at time t.    Equation 
(2.1) can be derived under the assumption that buyer- and seller-initiated trades are 
equally likely.  The Bayesian estimation of this cost measure using the Gibbs sampler is 
described in detail in Hasbrouck (2006).13   



















D  is the number of days in month t for stock i, 
,i t
dvol  is the dollar volume in day 
d, and 
,i d
r is the daily return.  While the bid-ask spread captures the cost of executing a 
small trade, the Illiq variable is akin to Kyle’s lambda and is meant to capture the price 
                                                 
13 The Gibbs estimate is obtained from Joel Hasbrouck’s website: 
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~jhasbrou/Research/GibbsEstimates2006/Liquidityestimates2006.htm. 
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impact of a trade.  I adjust this measure as in Acharya and Pedersen (2005) to make it 
stationary and to remove outliers: 
 






 is the ratio of the value-weighted market portfolio at the end of the month t-1 
to that of the market portfolio in July of 1962.  




, 1, , , , 1, , , , , , , ,
sign( )e e
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 is the return in excess of the market return and 
, ,i d t
v  is the volume on day d 
in month t for stock i.  This measure is motivated by the Campbell, Grossman, and Wang 
(1993) model and is meant to capture temporary price fluctuations arising from order 
flow.   
I also include in the analyses quoted and effective spread and quoted depth calculated 
from intra-day data.  I use a 5-second delay to match trades with quotes and apply the 
same filters discussed in Hvidkjaer (2006).  The quoted percentage spread is calculated 
for each trade as the ratio of the quoted bid-ask spread to the prevailing transaction price.  
The effective percentage half-spread is calculated for each transaction as the absolute 
value of the difference between the transaction price and the quote midpoint, divided by 
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the bid-ask midpoint. The quoted depth is the average of quoted bid-ask lots multiplied 
by bid-ask quotes.  In addition, I compute a realized spread, which is the ex-post realized 
bid-ask spread paid by the investors for each transaction in the dataset.  The calculation is 























P are the purchase and sale 
prices from the dataset.  This measure includes the bid-ask spread, market impact of the 
trade as well as the intra-day return on the day of the trade.  The total spread is the sum of 
the realized buy and sell spreads.  Previous studies (Korajczyk and Sadka 2008, and 
Eckbo and Norli 2002) have shown that there is high correlation among these liquidity 
measures and that there is a common component that accounts for most of the variation 
across individual liquidity measures.  
There is likely to be endogeneity in the relationship between holding periods and 
liquidity measures used in this paper.  As trading interest in a stock increases so does its 
liquidity.  But we can also think of a stock as having a baseline exogenous cost 
component along the lines of Amihud and Mendelson (1986).  Although the liquidity 
level of a penny stock, for instance, will increase with increased trading interest, it will 
not achieve the same level of liquidity of a large cap stock purely based on that 
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increase.14  Figure 1 illustrates this notion graphically.  I plot the adjusted Amihud 
illiquidity ratio for IBM and Crown Petroleum Corp. over the 1991 to 1996 period.  
Although there is variation over time in the liquidity levels for both stocks, the average 
AdjIlliq ratio is significantly lower for IBM over the sample period. To capture this 
baseline component, I use annual averages of the liquidity measures in analyzing 
household holding periods. I later extend the analyses to incorporate time series variation 
in Section 2.5.  Table 2.1 reports the summary statistics and correlations for the liquidity 
measures for stocks traded by households in the dataset.  
 
2.3 Holding Periods and Transaction Costs 
2.3.1 Transaction Level Analyses 
To examine the relationship between holding periods and transaction costs, I first 
calculate a holding period for each transaction in the dataset.  The holding period is 
defined as the number of trading days from the first purchase of a stock to the first sale.15  
This method provides 806,404 holding period observations.  The average and the median 
holding period are 185 and 86 trading days respectively.  Figure 2 shows the median 
holding periods for transactions grouped by investors’ age, account type, the amount of 
capital they have invested in the stock market, as well as transactions grouped by the 
underlying stocks’ liquidity.16  The median holding period is shorter for stocks held in 
retirement accounts.  Investors who are older and who have less wealth invested in the 
                                                 
14 In the analyses that follow, I also explicitly control for other potential determinants of holding periods 
such as stock and investor characteristics. 
15 This approach follows Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2008).  I obtain similar results by defining the 
holding period as the time period until all positive positions are closed, as in Feng and Seasholes (2005). 
16 In the figure, a stock is defined as Illiquid if it belongs to the lowest liquidity decile of stocks ranked 
according to the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio.  Other category includes all other stocks not in the 
lowest liquidity decile. 
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market have shorter holding periods.  There is also a strong relationship between holding 
periods and liquidity of stocks traded by the investors in the dataset. 
To explore this relationship further, I rank and assign the 806,404 holding period 
observations to ten groups based on the length of the holding period.  For the stocks in 
each group, I then calculate averages for the liquidity measures, price, and market 
capitalization.  The liquidity measures are calculated as of the purchase day, by averaging 
monthly or daily measures over the previous 12 months.  The results are reported in 
Table 2.2, which show a strong relationship between holding periods and liquidity 
measures.  The relationship is monotonic for most of the measures and is not a simple 
function of price or market capitalization.  The adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure, for 
instance, increases monotonically from 0.91 to 1.75.  There is a 54 basis points (bps) 
difference in the quoted spread and a 64 bps difference in the realized spread between the 
highest and the lowest holding period groups.   
Figure 3 shows this relationship graphically.  I plot Kaplan-Meier survival 
probabilities for stocks that are in the highest illiquidity decile using the adjusted Amihud 
illiquidity measure, and for all other stocks in the dataset.  The x-axis shows the number 
of days that have passed since the purchase of a stock, and the two lines plot the 
probability of an investor holding a stock conditional upon no sale up to that point for the 
two groups of stocks.  Stocks ranked in the highest illiquidity decile have a significantly 
higher survival probability.  The initial univariate results suggest that holding periods are 
strongly related to measures of baseline transaction costs as predicted in hypothesis H1a.    
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To incorporate stock and investor characteristics, I utilize a hazard model in the 
analysis of household holding periods.17  With hazard models, an investor’s trade 
decision can be explicitly modeled by considering the investor’s sell-hold decision each 
day.  In this paper, I use a Cox proportional hazard model with potentially time varying 
explanatory variables.18  The hazard model takes the form: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )' '0 expt t x t zλ λ β α= +  (2.6) 
 
This is essentially a statistical model that describes how long an investor in the dataset 
will hold a stock before selling it.  The left hand side variable, ( )tλ , is the hazard rate,  
the probability of selling a stock at day t conditional upon holding that stock until that 
point in time.  The explanatory variables are called covariates and can either be constant 
or time varying.   In equation (2.6), x’ represents time-varying covariates and z’ 
represents covariates that are fixed over time. ( )0 tλ  is called the baseline hazard rate and 
describes the average hazard rate when the independent covariates are equal to zero.  
Using the Cox (1972) estimator one can estimate coefficients on x and z (α  and β ) 
without specifying a baseline ( )0 tλ  hazard rate.   
The static covariates used in this paper are investor and stock characteristics, which 
are explained in detail in the tables that follow.  The only time-varying covariate is a 
dummy variable that takes on a value of one for each day the stock price trades above its 
                                                 
17 The hazard framework has been previously used by Seru, Shumway and Stoffman (2008) and Feng and 
Seasholes (2005) in a similar context to model the disposition effect. 
18 Details about estimating the proportional hazard model can be found in Cox and Oakes (1984).   
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purchase price.  This dummy variable acts as a proxy for the disposition effect.  Positions 
that are not closed by the end of the sample period are treated as censored observations.  
As there is likely to be seasonality in purchases and sales, calendar month dummies are 
also included as static variables in the hazard regressions that follow.19  In the tables that 
follow, I follow standard reporting conventions and report hazard ratios instead of 
coefficients from the holding period regressions.  The hazard ratio is similar to the odds 
ratio in binary choice models.  It is defined as the ratio of two hazard functions when one 
of the explanatory variables is changed by one unit holding everything else constant.  
Since the interpretation of a hazard ratio is more intuitive for dummy variables, I 
transform the explanatory variables into dummy intervals.   
Table 2.3 shows the results of the hazard regressions.  I report results using the 
adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio as the transaction costs measure to save space.  Similar 
results are obtained using Pastor and Stambaugh’s reversal gamma and the Gibbs 
estimate of Roll’s transaction costs measure.  As explained before, the transaction costs 
measure is calculated by averaging the monthly Amihud illiquidity ratio over the12 
months prior to the purchase date.  I rank all stocks by the Amihud illiquidity ratio and 
create dummy variable (AdjIlliq Dum) that takes on a value of one if stock belongs to the 
highest illiquidity quintile.  The hazard ratios corresponding to the dummy variables have 
an intuitive interpretation.  They indicate the probability of a sale (conditional upon no 
sale up to that point) given that the underlying stock belongs to the highest illiquidity 
group divided by the probability of a sale given that the stock does not belong to that 
group.  A stock in the highest illiquidity group is 0.6 times as likely to be sold as a stock 
                                                 
19 Open stock positions, for instance, may be closed out in December for tax reasons.   
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not belonging to that group.20  In Model III, I control for investors characteristics and 
obtain a similar result.  As in the univariate analysis, I find that transaction costs are a 
significant determinant of holding periods of individual investors.  The average investor 
is cognizant of liquidity and pays attention to the transaction costs of the stocks she 
trades.  
The results I report are robust to fixed household effects.  One way to capture 
heterogeneity across households within a hazard framework is to assume a different 
baseline hazard rate for each household, but compute common coefficients on the 
explanatory variables.  The model is estimated by partial likelihood using the method of 
stratification.   Model II in Table 2.3 shows that the effect of transaction costs variable 
increases once I control for fixed household effects.  The results suggest that there is 
variation in holding periods for different stocks for a given household, and that these 
holding periods are positively related to transaction costs. 
I find support for the hypothesis (H1b) that the correlation between holding periods 
and transactions costs increases with investor sophistication and experience. 
Characteristics we associate with investor sophistication are correlated with shorter 
holding periods.  However, as evidenced by the hazard ratios on the interaction terms 
(Model IV in Table 2.3), those who are sophisticated tend to pay attention to the 
transaction costs of the stocks they trade.  Individuals, who are professionals, who have 
traded options or foreign securities or who have held short positions, have holding 
periods that are positively correlated with transaction costs.  Those who hold mutual 
funds, on the other hand, have holding periods that are negatively correlated with 
                                                 
20 A stock in the lowest illiquidity group, on the other hand is 1.2 times more likely to be sold than a stock 
not belonging to that group. 
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transaction costs.  Individuals who are retired and individuals who trade stocks in their 
retirement account are more sensitive to transaction costs.  In addition, households who 
have more concentrated portfolios pay more attention to the liquidity of the underlying 
stocks they trade.   
To explore the role of investor sophistication further, I create a numeric variable to 
proxy for the level of investor sophistication.  Sophistication variable starts at a value of 
zero and is increased by one for each characteristic that one would associate with investor 
sophistication.  I follow Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) and assume that financial 
sophistication is correlated with education and resources available to an investor.  I also 
use information contained in investors’ trades.  Table 2.4 describes the criteria used to 
construct the Sophistication variable. I run the same hazard regression as before (Model I 
in Table 2.3), but instead of pooling across all investors, I run a separate regression for 
each group of investors who have the same Sophistication value.  For instance, all 
investors with a Sophistication value equal to six would be one group.  Figure 4, plots the 
hazard ratios on the AdjIlliq Dum variable for the different groups of investors ranked by 
Sophistication.  The relationship between holding periods and transaction costs is 
stronger for more sophisticated households.  The relationship is negative for households 
that are least sophisticated, and there is a monotonic increase in the strength of this 
relationship as we go from the lowest sophistication group to the highest.  In Table 2.4, I 
report similar result pooling all investors together.  I create a dummy variable 
(Sophistication > 3 Dum) that takes on a value of one if the Sophistication value for a 
given household in the dataset is greater than three.  An investor who is sophisticated is 
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0.4 times as likely to sell an illiquid security at a given point in time, compared to an 
unsophisticated investor who is 0.6 times as likely to sell an illiquid security. 
Although the differences in holding periods for stocks with different liquidity levels 
are significant, they are substantially lower than the calibrated values in Vayanos (1998) 
and Constantinides (1986).  Vayanos, for instance, predicts an increase in holding period 
of 6 years when transaction costs increase from 0.5% to 2%.  In comparison, a similar 
increase in transaction costs would increase the holding period of investors by about 190 
trading days in the dataset used in this paper.  The empirical results are closer to the 
calibrated values in Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2006) who predict a similar change in 
holding periods as in this paper.  The results in this section suggest that models that 
incorporate potentially exogenous liquidity or trading needs are more likely to be 
representative of actual investor behavior.  The results also offer a potential explanation 
for the discrepancy between the empirically observed liquidity premium and the one 
predicted by the models in which the holding periods are endogenously determined as in 
Vayanos (1998) and Constantinides (1986).         
 
2.3.2 Robustness Checks  
 To make sure the results are robust to underlying stock characteristics, I include 
book-to-market, size and momentum characteristics in the hazard regressions.  As before, 
to get a more intuitive interpretation of the results, each year I segment stocks into 
quintiles based on these stock characteristics.  Dummy variables are created and take on a 
value of one if a stock in the dataset falls into one of the five groups.  These 
characteristics are calculated based on the information available at the beginning of the 
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month in which a sale is made.  Table 2.5 summarizes the results from hazard regressions 
using these characteristics.  The transaction costs measure remains significant after I 
control for stock characteristics, while the economic and statistical significance of stock 
characteristics is reduced once I control for liquidity.  On average, households tend to 
hold value and small stocks longer.  Relationship between momentum and holding period 
appears to be U-shaped, but it is more significant at the high return end.  A stock 
belonging to the highest momentum quintile is 1.4 times more likely to be sold 
conditional on no sale up to that point in time.   
The disposition effect (Shefrin and Statman 1985), the tendency of individual 
investors to hold on to losing stocks too long and to sell winners too quickly, has been 
shown to be a significant driver of trading behavior in a variety of contexts for both 
individual and institutional investors.  If the disposition effect is the main driver of a 
decision to buy/sell (Grinblatt and Kellaharjou 2001),  then the holding period and the 
liquidity of a stock would be determined to some extent by how much the stock’s current 
price is above the investors’ weighted average purchase price for that stock.  Given the 
robust and significant relationship that has been established in the literature between 
trading decisions and the disposition effect, and given its close relation to liquidity, I use 
the disposition effect as a control in the hazard regressions.  To do this, as mentioned 
earlier, I create a time-varying covariate to capture the disposition effect.  A dummy 
variable (Disp Dum) is set to one for each day a stock in an investor’s portfolio trades 
above its purchase price.  I run the same hazard model as before, but now I include the 
disp variable as a time-varying covariate.  The results are provided in Table 2.5.  Using 
household level controls, I find that an individual is 1.8 times more likely to sell a stock 
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when it is trading above its purchase price than when it is not.  The transaction costs 
variable is significant after controlling for the disposition effect, but is not able to explain 
away this effect.  It is also worth noting that the interaction term is positive, indicating 
that the disposition effect is stronger among less liquid stocks.  Households are more 
likely to sell an illiquid stock that is trading above the purchase price than one that is not 
illiquid. 
Existence of asymmetric information complicates the analysis.  It is not entirely clear 
how aggregate asymmetric information for a given security would affect its average 
holding period.  On the one hand, one can think of asymmetric information as a 
component of transaction costs, which investors take into account in selecting which 
securities to hold.  On the other hand, if investors trade for both liquidity and information 
reasons, allocational inefficiencies (Garleanu and Pedersen 2007) could reduce the 
correlation between holding periods and liquidity.  I control for aggregate asymmetric 
information in a given security by including the probability of information based trading 
(PIN) measure (Easley et al. 1997) calculated from intra-day data.21  As before, I 
compute an annual PIN dummy variable for each stock in the dataset.  PIN Dum takes on 
a value of one if the stock is in the highest PIN group.  The results appear in Table 2.5 
under Model V.  The PIN measure significantly reduces the holding period of investors.  
The transaction costs measure, however, does not lose its economic or statistical 
significance.   
As an additional control, I also remove potentially informative trades from the 
sample.   To control for information at the investor level, I run the same model as in the 
                                                 
21 A detailed description is contained in Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2004).  The data is provided by 
Soeren Hvidkjaer at http://www.smith.umd.edu/faculty/hvidkjaer/pin1983-2001.zip. 
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previous section, but remove from the sample trades that may have been conducted for 
informational reasons.  To identify trades that are not motivated by liquidity needs, I 
follow the same approach in Stoffman (2007).  If an individual investor sells his holdings 
of one security and then immediately uses the proceeds to buy another security, it is 
unlikely that the particular trade is motivated by liquidity needs.  I thus exclude trades 
that are one trading day apart and for which differences in the values of the trades are less 
than 5%.   Model I in Table 2.5 shows the results from the hazard regression with these 
trades removed from the sample.  The prior results become stronger when I exclude these 
potentially informative trades from the dataset.   
 
2.3.3 Portfolio Level Analyses 
 I have thus far examined trading decisions of households at the transaction level.  I 
now consider liquidity decisions at the portfolio level.  Specifically, I analyze the 
determinants of overall liquidity of household portfolios and examine how portfolio 
liquidity is related to households’ average holding periods.   





































Eq  is the value of stock k in household i’s portfolio at time t, and
,i t
kAdjIlliq  is 
the adjusted Amihud illiquidity measure of stock k in month t. 
t
MktIlliq is the market 
illiquidity, calculated as the equal weighted average AdjIlliq of all stocks in month t.  
Since average liquidity varies over time, 
t
MktIlliq is used as an adjustment factor as in 
Amihud (2002).  I average the 
,i t
PIlliq  over the sample period to compute an average 
portfolio illiquidity for each household.  Households hold mostly liquid stocks in their 
portfolio.  If we were to rank all stocks by the AdjIlliq measure, assign them to percentile 
ranks, and then calculate a weighted average illiquidity rank for the stocks in an 
investor’s portfolio, 50% of the households would have an average portfolio illiquidity 
rank that is in the bottom 8th percentile and 75% of the households would have an 
average portfolio illiquidity rank that is in the bottom 20th percentile.  
I calculate a holding period for each household by averaging the holding period for 
the transactions made by that household.  In calculating the average holding periods, I 
treat positions that are not closed by the end of the sample period as censored.  The cross-
sectional average and median holding period across households are 437 and 348 trading 
days respectively.22   Figure 5 shows the distribution of the average holding periods of 
households calculated based on transactions that are closed by the end of the sample 
period, as well as the distribution of holding periods calculated taking into account 
transactions that are not closed and treated as censored.  
Table 2.6 shows the results from regressing average portfolio liquidity on household 
holding periods and household characteristics:  
                                                 
22 The average and median holding period considering only positions that are closed  (e.g. ignoring 
censored observations) are 217 and 168 trading days respectively.  
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PIlliq  is the average portfolio illiquidity of household i. 
i
HP  is the 
average holding period of household i, and 
,i k
InvCh  is the kth demographic characteristic 
of household i described in detail in Table 2.6.  Holding period is a statistically 
significant determinant of portfolio liquidity.  Given that the median and the 75th 
percentile adjusted portfolio illiquidity,
i
PIlliq , across households is 0.037 and 0.105 
respectively, what I report is also an economically significant relationship.  In Model II, I 
show that households with higher amounts of wealth invested in the stock market hold 
more liquid stocks in their portfolio.  The same is true for individuals who are older and 
retired.  Investors who hold less diversified portfolios hold more liquid stocks in their 
portfolios.   Overall, the portfolio level results are consistent with the earlier results and 
with hypothesis H1a. 
 
2.4 Holding Periods and Returns 
2.4.1 Amortized Transaction Costs and Returns 
 In this section, I study the implications of liquidity decisions of individual investors on 
investment performance.  More specifically, I test hypothesis H2a outlined in Section 2.1.  
The liquidity premium in Amihud and Mendelson (1986) is driven by rents earned by 
investors who have longer investment horizons.  These investors can amortize transaction 
costs over a longer expected time period and therefore require a lower compensation for 
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holding assets with higher transaction costs.  Illiquid assets are shunned by investors who 
have a shorter time horizon and heavily discounted by them.  As a result, long-term 
investors who bear these costs less frequently earn rents above and beyond the amortized 
costs of transacting these assets.      
I calculate a holding period for each transaction in the dataset that is closed-out by the 
end of the sample period.  I then calculate cumulative raw returns and returns in excess of 
size, book-to-market and momentum matched portfolios, as in Daniel et al. (1999), over 
the holding period for each transaction.  Characteristics-adjusted excess returns are 
calculated to make sure that the differences in returns are not driven by differences in 
stock characteristics.23  To be able to make comparisons across different holding periods, 
I calculate average daily returns from cumulative raw and excess returns as: 
 









= + −∏  (2.9) 
HP is the holding period measured in days, and 
,i d
r is the daily raw or characteristics-
adjusted excess return for transaction i in day d.  I also compute 1, 6, and 12 month raw 
and excess returns starting from the day of purchase.  Transaction costs consist of round 
trip commissions divided by the value of purchases and sales, as well as the realized bid-
ask spread for purchases and sales, as described in Section 2.2.  Transaction costs are 
divided by the holding period to arrive at amortized transaction costs.  Consistent with 
Barber and Odean (2000), I find that on average, each transaction costs one percent in 
bid-ask spread and 1.4 percent in commissions.  In the analyses that follow, I exclude 
                                                 
23 In the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model, investors are risk-neutral and in the absence of transaction 
costs all securities would earn the risk free rate in equilibrium. 
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transactions with a holding period of less than two days and stocks priced below two 
dollars.   
I rank all transactions by the holding period and place them into five groups.  I then 
average returns for the transactions in each group.  The results are reported in Table 2.7.24  
In the lowest holding period group, stocks are held on average for 10 days and earn 34.21 
basis points (bps) per day before transaction costs.  In contrast, stocks in the highest 
holding period group are held on average for 543 days and earn 2.31 bps per day before 
transaction costs.  Average characteristics-adjusted excess returns are 20.65 bps and -3.59 
bps per day before transaction costs, respectively, for the two groups.  Thus, short-term 
traders earn greater daily returns before transaction costs than long-term traders.  Short 
term traders also earn greater 1, 6 and 12 month returns before transaction costs.  Once I 
control for transaction costs, however, the picture changes.  For the lowest holding period 
group, the average return minus amortized commissions and bid-ask spreads is 0.39 bps 
per day, compared with a net return of 1.14 bps per day for the highest holding period 
group.  Moreover, characteristics-adjusted excess returns are negative for all groups after 
controlling for transaction costs, but significantly more so for the low holding period 
group.  The difference in returns between the lowest and highest holding period groups is 
significant.  These results are consistent with hypothesis H2a outlined in Section 2.1, in 
the sense that the returns, net of transaction costs, for households with longer holding 
periods are higher than for households who have shorter holding periods.  The 
relationship for raw returns, however, is not monotonic.   
Since I am examining transaction returns and not returns for the whole portfolio, the 
results could be biased if only profiTable 2.trades are closed out producing a disposition 
                                                 
24 Results are reported at the transaction level.  I obtain similar results if I aggregate to the household level. 
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effect.  In other words, there might be an upward bias for short-term trades, since they 
may consist mostly of positions that are closed out because the prevailing price is above 
the purchase price.  In response, I consider returns for fixed holding periods from the day 
of purchase (1, 6, 12 month returns are also reported in Table 2.7).  However, this gets us 
away from the notion of holding period returns.  As a result, I also remove from the 
sample those households with a strong tendency to close out positions that trade above 
the purchase price.  To identify these households, I split the dataset into two equal time 
periods and use the first period (from 1991 to 1993) to calculate coefficients on the disp 
variable explained in Section 2.3.  I eliminate households with a positive disp coefficient 
calculated with a 10% confidence level or higher.  I use the second time period (from 
1994 to 1996) to calculate holding period returns and amortized transaction costs as 
described earlier.  The results are in Panel B of Table 2.6.  Holding period raw and 
characteristics-adjusted excess returns are now more uniform.  Differences in raw returns 
between the high and low holding period groups are not significant. There is now a 
monotonic relationship in returns net of amortized transaction costs across holding period 
groups, consistent with hypothesis H2a.   
2.4.2 Liquidity Decisions and Returns 
 There are cross-sectional differences in the correlation between holding periods and 
transaction costs across households.  As described in Section 2.1, this correlation may 
impact portfolio performance of households on a gross and a net basis.  First, households 
that do not pay attention to transaction costs would be expected to pay higher transaction 
costs, generating lower net returns.  Second, a negative correlation between holding 
periods and transactions costs could also indicate low levels of sophistication and market 
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knowledge, resulting in lower gross returns.  To identify the two types of households, I 
use the same hazard model as before, but now instead of pooling across all households, I 
estimate the coefficient on the transaction costs variable for each household separately.  
In order to obtain robust estimates, I require that households make at least 50 round-trip 
trades over the sample period, and I only keep estimates that are calculated with a 10% 
confidence level or higher.25  The summary statistics for the transaction costs coefficient 
calculated from household level hazard regressions are reported in Table 2.8.  For the 
majority of households in the dataset (over 60%), the correlation between holding periods 
and transaction costs is positive.  Most investors pay attention to the liquidity level of 
stocks they trade.   
The relationship between holding periods and transaction costs has strong 
implications for investment performance.  I form two groups based on the sign of the 
coefficient on the transaction costs variable, and calculate 1, 6 and 12 month and holding 
period returns for each transaction as described in the previous section.  I then calculate 
averages for the two groups.  The results are in Table 2.9.  There is a stark difference in 
the investment performance between the two groups.  Households that pay attention to 
transaction costs earn about 20.5 bps in gross returns and 10.7 bps in characteristics-
adjusted excess returns each day, compared to 0.1 bps in gross returns and -6.6 bps in 
excess returns each day for households that do not.  Households that pay attention to 
transaction costs pay less in amortized spreads and have higher net returns and net 
characteristics-adjusted excess returns.  They earn 7.1 bps per day in net returns, 
compared to a loss of -10.9 bps per day for households whose holding periods are 
negatively related to transaction costs.  The differences in returns are all statistically 
                                                 
25 I obtain similar results using 20 or 30 trades instead of 50 trades.   
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significant except for the one month returns.  Since the differences are significant for 
both gross and net returns, the positive relationship between holding periods and 
transaction costs is consistent with the hypothesis (H2b) that investors who pay attention 
to liquidity earn greater gross and net returns.   
 
2.5 Individual Investors and Demand for Liquid Securities 
2.5.1 Common Demand for Liquid Securities 
 In this section, I extend the analysis to consider how households as a group make 
liquidity decisions over time.  As described in Section 2.1, commonality in liquidity can 
arise from investors demanding liquidity at the same time.  Increase in uncertainty about 
changes in future income or wealth, for instance, can cause investors to tilt their 
portfolios towards more liquid assets at the same time.  To test whether there is systemic 
variation in the demand for liquid assets, I employ a similar methodology used in Kumar 
and Lee (2006) and Barber, Odean and Zhu (2003), who investigate correlation in the 
trades of individual investors.  Since I make comparisons over time under different 
regimes of aggregate liquidity, I consider stock liquidity rankings instead of stock 
liquidity levels.  Each month, I rank stocks based on the adjusted Amihud illiquidity 
measure and assign them to percentile ranks.  A stock ranked in the 100th percentile 
would be the most illiquid stock in a given month.  Similarly, a stock ranked in the 1st 
percentile would be the most liquid.   
For groups of non-overlapping investors, G, I compute a time series of normalized 
differences in the liquidity ranks of stocks purchased and sold: 
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V are the total value of buys and sells, respectively, for investor i in 
month t. 
t
AdjIlliRank is the weighted average adjusted illiquidity rank of stock holdings 
of investor i belonging to group G in month t using one month lagged adjusted illiquidity 
ranks. G
t
IlliqBSI is similar to a buy-sell imbalance index and indicates whether investors 
belonging to group G are net buyers or sellers of liquid securities in a given month.  If the 
demand for liquid securities is independent across households, then purchases and sales 
of liquid stocks by one group of investors will be uncorrelated with that of another group.  
To test for this independence, I form 5,000 pairs of non-overlapping investor groups 
containing 500, 1,000 and 5,000 investors.  For each G
t
IlliqBSI , I then remove the effects 
of common dependence due to the market factor and common variation in all household 




G G G G G
t MKT t BSI t t
IlliqBSI MKT BSIβ β β ε= + + +  (2.11) 
 
In the equation above, 
t
MKT is the month t market return in excess of the risk free rate, 
and
t
BSI is the buy-sell imbalance for all households in a given month t, defined as: 
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V are the total value of purchases and sales, respectively, of investor i in 
month t.  I aggregate over all N investors.  The reason for this regression is to remove the 
common component in the households’ net demand for liquid securities due to market 
movements and changes in overall household demand unrelated to liquidity.  I then 
compute correlations of the residuals, G
t
ε , for different pairs of investor groups.   
The results are reported in Table 2.10.  The correlation values range from 18% to 
32% depending on the number of investors used in the simulation.  All correlations are 
statistically different from zero.  These results suggest the existence of a systemic 
component in the demand for liquid securities across households.  The results support 
hypothesis H3a, that there is systemic variation in the demand for liquid securities.   
 
2.5.2 Aggregate Market Liquidity and Household Demand for Liquid Securities 
 As mentioned in Section 2.1, a number of papers treat retail investors as noise traders 
providing constant liquidity to the market.  However, if there is systemic variation in the 
demand for liquid assets by individual investors, as I have shown in the previous section, 
then their role as liquidity providers to the rest of the market is not clear.  In fact, changes 
in aggregate liquidity can arise endogenously from correlated trading by individual 
investors.  In this section I investigate how this systemic demand for liquid securities 
varies with changes in aggregate market liquidity.  I test whether there is a flight to 
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liquidity, and examine if a subset of individual investors provide liquidity to the market 
by buying illiquid securities during times of low market liquidity.   
I calculate monthly market liquidity as the equal-weighted average of the adjusted 
Amihud illiquidity ratio for all stocks in a given month (as in Amihud 2002 and Acharya 
and Pedersen 2005).26  As before, since I make comparisons over time under different 
regimes of aggregate liquidity, I consider the liquidity rankings of stocks instead of their 
liquidity levels.  For all households, I compute difference in the liquidity ranks of stocks 
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V are the total value of buys and sells, respectively, for investor i in month t. 
i
t
AdjIlliqRank is the weighted average adjusted illiquidity rank of stock holdings of 
investor i in month t using one month lagged adjusted illiquidity ranks.  I compute the 
sum over all N investors.  Figure 6 plots ALLIlliqBSI  and the aggregate market level of 
illiquidity, MktIlliq, over the sample period.  In the figure, the period with low market 
liquidity corresponds with the Mexican peso crises in 1994.  Consistent with the previous 
studies, I find that there are more buys when market illiquidity is high.  However, once 
we consider the liquidity level of the underlying stocks that are traded, the picture 
                                                 
26 I obtain qualitatively similar results if I use the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity measure.  The 
correlation between the measure used in this paper and the Pastor and Stambaugh measure is 30%. 
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changes.  The correlation between ALLIlliqBSI  and MktIlliq is -35%.  Individual 
investors tend to buy liquid stocks and sell illiquid stocks when market liquidity is low.   
I split the data into five equal time periods ranked by the aggregate level of market 
illiquidity.  The first time period corresponds to the 34 months with the lowest level of 
market illiquidity, and the last period to 34 months with the highest level.  Table 2.10 
reports the differences in the illiquidity ranks of stocks bought and sold during these five 
time periods, and also during the month corresponding to the highest level of market 
illiquidity.  When market illiquidity is at its highest point during the 1991 to 1994 period, 
the difference in the illiquidity rank of the stocks purchased and sold by households is 
1.1.  When one considers the fact that 50% of the households have an average portfolio 
illiquidity rank that is in the bottom 8th percentile, the differences I report are both 
economically and statistically significant.  The last column shows the differences in 
illiquidity ranks of stock purchases and sales adjusted for household portfolio level of 
liquidity.  For this adjustment, I subtract the weighted average illiquidity rank of each 
household’s portfolio from the illiquidity rank of stocks transacted by that household.  
The magnitude of the differences is lower but still significant and consistent with the 
earlier result that investors tend to purchase more liquid securities when aggregate 
liquidity is low.   
Table 2.11 shows the results from regressing illiquidity ranks of stocks purchased or 
sold in a given month on market illiquidity and investor wealth and income.  I estimate 
the following regression:  
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, 0 1 , 2 3
4 , 5 , 6
7 ,
k t k t i t
k t i k t t t i
k t t i
TransAdjIlliqrank Buy Affluent MktIlliqDum
Buy Affluent Buy MktIlliqDum MktIlliqDum Affluent
Buy MktIlliqDum Affluent
β β β β
β β β
β
= + + +




In equation (2.14), 
,k t
TransAdjIlliqrank  is the lagged adjusted illiquidity rank of the 
underlying stock for transaction k in month t. 27 To get a more intuitive interpretation of 
the regression results, I transform the market illiquidity variable into a dummy variable 
(
t
MktIlliqDum ) that takes on a value of one for the month in which market illiquidity is 
at its highest during the sample period.  
,k t
Buy  is a dummy variable that takes on a value 
of one if the transaction k in month t is a purchase, and 
i
Affluent  is a dummy variable 
that takes on a value of one if investor i is in the highest income bracket (>$100,000) and 
has invested more than $100,000 in the stock market during the sample period.28  Model I 
in Table 2.11 shows that on average, when market illiquidity is high, households trade 
more liquid stocks.  The coefficient on the interaction term,  MktIlliq Dum Buy× , in 
Model II is negative.  Since I am using dummy variables, the coefficient on the 
interaction term shows how much the illiquidity rank of the stocks purchased are higher 
or lower than stocks sold during times of low market liquidity.  The -1.6 coefficient on 
the interaction term is economically and statistically significant.  Controlling for fixed 
household effects in Model III slightly reduces the effect to -1.0. 
In hypothesis H3c, I predict that households with higher levels of wealth and income 
buy illiquid assets that have dropped in price providing liquidity to the market.  The 
                                                 
27 In the regressions, I use lagged (previous month’s) illiquidity ranks for stocks transacted in a given 
month.  I obtain similar results using contemporaneous illiquidity ranks.    
28 I obtain similar results if I use a $75,000 or $150,000 cut-off for income and wealth invested in the stock 
market.  
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interaction term,  MktIlliq Dum Buy Affluent× × , in Model IV in Table 2.11 is positive.  
Households with higher incomes and higher amounts invested in the stock market tend to 
buy more illiquid stocks during times of low market liquidity.  The net effect of an 
increase in illiquidity rank of purchases by Affluent households during times of high 
market illiquidity is 0.93.  As before, this result is both economically and statistically 
significant.  The results are consistent with the hypothesis that investors with deep 
pockets provide liquidity to the market by purchasing illiquid stocks when market 
liquidity is low. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
 This paper investigates both portfolio and stock level liquidity decisions of 66,000 
households from a large discount brokerage.  It provides an empirical link between 
investor decisions and the liquidity premium observed in the market.  Three main 
conclusions follow from the analysis.  First, transaction costs are an important 
determinant of investment policies and trading decisions.  Consistent with theoretical 
models of investor behavior, households rationally reduce the frequency with which they 
trade illiquid securities subject to high transaction costs.  This finding is robust to various 
controls, including household and stock characteristics as well as the disposition effect 
and the level of asymmetric information. The results also hold at the portfolio level. 
Consistent with the notion of liquidity clienteles, investors with longer investment 
horizons tend to hold more illiquid securities.  There is cross-sectional variation in the 
relationship between holding periods and transaction costs across households, and I find 
that this relationship is stronger among more sophisticated investors.  Second, I show that 
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liquidity decisions have important implications for investment performance.  As 
postulated by Amihud and Mendelson (1986), households with longer holding periods 
earn significantly higher returns after amortized transaction costs.  In addition, 
households that have holding periods that are negatively related to transaction costs earn, 
on average, lower gross and net returns.  Finally, this paper shows that there is systemic 
variation in demand for liquid assets across investors.  Consistent with the notion of flight 
to liquidity, households are net demanders of liquid securities during times of low 
aggregate market liquidity.  Households with higher incomes and higher wealth invested 
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Table 2.4: Household Sophistication Measure 
 
The top panel lists the criteria used to construct the Sophistication variable. This variable is increased by a 
value of one if an investor in the dataset meets anyone of the criteria listed n the table. The bottom panel 
reports hazard ratios from the holding period regression, where the conditional probability of sale is the 
dependent variable.  AdjIlliq Dum is a dummy variable that takes on a value equal to one if a stock in the 
dataset is in the highest quintile ranked by the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio calculated over the 
previous 12 months prior to a transaction.  Sophistication > 3 Dum is dummy variable set to one if the 
Sophistication variable for an investor in the dataset is greater than three.  Calendar month dummies (not 
reported) are twelve dummy variables that take on a value of one if the month of the transaction is equal to 
the month dummy.  Robust standard errors are calculated as in Lin and Wei (1989).  Ties are handled using 




Income > $75K  + 1 
Equity Investments > $45K  + 1 
Investor is a professional  + 1 
Trades Options  + 1 
Trades Foreign Securities  + 1 
Does not invest in Mutual Funds  + 1 
Has held a Short position  + 1 
Portfolio  Diversification < 0.3  + 1 
      
  Haz Ratio p-val 
AdjIlliq Dum 0.625*** <.0001 
Sophistication > 3 Dum 1.110*** <.0001 
Sophistication > 3 * AdjIlliq Dum 0.714*** <.0001 
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Table 2.6: Portfolio Liquidity and Holding Periods 
 
This table reports the results of regressions using portfolio illiquidity as the dependent variable.  The 
independent variables are investor holding periods and investor characteristics.  PIlliq is the average 
household portfolio illiquidity as defined in Section 2.3.  Holding period is the average household holding 
period.  It is calculated by averaging holding periods for all transactions of a given investor.  Positions that 
are not closed-out by the end of the sample period are treated as censored observations.  A censored 
average is calculated assuming a Weibull distribution for the holding period. Investor characteristics are 
described in Table 3.  Robust standard errors are reported below coefficient estimates.  Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
  Model I Model II 
 Holding Period (years) 0.0515*** 0.0631*** 
  0.0079 0.0152 
 Age   -0.0012*** 
    0.0002 
 Income   0.0002 
    0.0008 
 Married Dum   -0.0219 
    0.0007 
 Professional Dum   -0.0205*** 
    0.0069 
 Retired Dum   -0.0181** 
    0.0099 
 Male Dum   0.0591*** 
    0.0097 
 Foreign securities Dum   0.0487*** 
    0.0079 
 Mutual fund user Dum   0.001 
    0.0057 
 Option user Dum   0.0709*** 
    0.0096 
 Short user Dum   0.0122*** 
    0.0065 
 Log Total Equity   -0.0981*** 
    0.0024 
 Diversification   -0.0334*** 
    0.0113 
 N 63,024 19,746 
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Table 2.7: Holding Period Returns 
 
This table reports transaction returns to holding period groups.  Holding period is defined as the time period 
from the first purchase to the first sale of a security. Transactions are ranked and put into holding period 
quintiles.  1, 6, and 12 month returns are calculated starting from the date of purchase.  Holding period 
returns are average daily returns (reported in basis points) over the holding period.  Excess returns are 
returns net of characteristics matched portfolios, as in Daniel et al. (1997).  Amortized spread is the realized 
spread (as defined in Table 2) divided by the holding period.  Amortized commission is the round-trip 
commission divided by the holding period.  Transactions with a purchase or sale price less than $2, and 
holding periods less than 2 days, are excluded from the sample.  Panel B reports returns for a sub-sample of 
the households in the 1994-1996 time period.  The 1991-1993 time period is used to calculate a coefficient 
on the disp variable for each household in the dataset.  Households with a positive disp coefficient 
significant at the 10% level are removed from the sample.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Returns to Holding Period Groups 
  Low 2 3 4 High High - Low 
1 Month Ret 0.045 0.036 0.011 0.004 0.001 -0.044*** 
1 Month Excess Ret 0.018 0.010 -0.006 -0.012 -0.013 -0.031*** 
6 Month Ret 0.079 0.112 0.132 0.054 0.008 -0.071*** 
6 Month Excess Ret -0.009 0.011 0.025 -0.031 -0.055 -0.045*** 
12 Month Ret 0.148 0.187 0.200 0.188 0.056 -0.092*** 
12 Month Excess Ret -0.014 0.007 0.012 -0.003 -0.081 -0.067*** 
Holding Period Ret (bps) 34.211 15.080 8.085 4.116 2.307 -31.904*** 
Holding Period Excess Ret (bps) 20.648 4.446 0.045 -2.778 -3.587 -24.235*** 
Holding Period Net Ret (bps) 0.386 3.280 2.603 1.358 1.137 0.751* 
Holding Period Net Excess Ret (bps) -13.177 -7.354 -5.436 -5.537 -4.757 8.420*** 
Amortized Spread (bps) 5.257 3.063 1.501 0.721 0.264 -4.993*** 
Amortized Commission (bps) 28.568 8.737 3.981 2.037 0.906 -27.662*** 
Holding Period 10 36 87 192 543 533*** 
Panel B: Bias Adjusted Returns to Holding Period Groups 
  Low 2 3 4 High High - Low 
1 Month Ret 0.016 0.027 0.020 0.010 0.002 -0.014*** 
1 Month Excess Ret -0.002 0.006 0.001 -0.006 -0.009 -0.007*** 
6 Month Ret 0.049 0.078 0.109 0.119 0.051 0.002 
6 Month Excess Ret -0.034 -0.013 0.007 0.011 -0.032 0.002 
12 Month Ret 0.112 0.153 0.201 0.232 0.187 0.075*** 
12 Month Excess Ret -0.038 -0.014 0.004 0.013 -0.024 0.014*** 
Holding Period Ret (bps) 1.383 2.626 4.739 5.031 4.371 2.988 
Holding Period Excess Ret (bps) -2.402 -4.392 -2.846 -2.547 -3.517 -1.115 
Holding Period Net Ret (bps) -38.105 -12.659 -2.171 1.514 2.676 40.781*** 
Holding Period Net Excess Ret (bps) -41.889 -19.677 -9.756 -6.065 -5.212 36.677*** 
Amortized Spread (bps) 5.588 3.844 1.819 0.886 0.377 -5.210*** 
Amortized Commission (bps) 33.900 11.441 5.091 2.631 1.318 -32.582*** 
Holding Period 7 24 59 125 309 302*** 
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Table 2.8: Household Transaction Costs Coefficient Estimates 
 
This table reports summary statistics of the transaction costs coefficient, which is calculated from 
household level hazard regressions described in Section 2.5.  AdjIlliq variable is used as the transaction 
costs measure.  To get robust estimates, households are required to have made at least 50 trades during the 
sample period to be included in the analysis.  The summary statistics for the coefficients calculated with at 












































Obs Significant at 
>10% 
Mean -0.3002 -0.5834 
Median -0.1089 -0.2752 
Std Dev 4.8435 7.5727 
Skew -29.745 -20.165 
Kurtosis 1170.52 507.27 
P5 -1.1015 -1.5748 
P25 -0.3366 -0.5266 
P75 0.1188 0.3018 
P95 0.6860 1.2017 
  52 
Table 2.9: Transaction Costs and Holding Period Returns 
 
This table reports transaction returns to two groups formed based on the sign of the transaction costs 
coefficient, which is calculated from household level hazard regressions described in Section 2.5.  AdjIlliq 
variable is used as the transaction costs measure.  To get robust estimates, households are required to have 
made at least 50 trades during the sample period to be included in the analysis.  1, 6, and 12 month returns 
are calculated starting from the date of purchase.  Holding period returns are average daily returns (reported 
in basis points) calculated from the first purchase of a security to the first sale.  Excess returns are returns 
net of characteristics matched portfolios, as in Daniel et al. (1997).  Amortized spread is the realized spread 
(as defined in Table 2) divided by the holding period.  Amortized commission is the round-trip commission 
divided by the holding period.  Transactions with a purchase or sale price less than $2, and holding periods 
less than 2 days, are excluded from the sample.  Panel B reports returns for the full sample, and Panel A 
reports returns where the coefficient on the AdjIlliq variable is calculated with at least 10% significance.  
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Observations with AdjIlliq Coefficient at >10% Significance 
  Positive Negative Positive - Negative 
1 Month Ret 0.018 0.018 0.001 
1 Month Excess Ret -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
6 Month Ret 0.079 0.066 0.013*** 
6 Month Excess Ret -0.010 -0.020 0.01*** 
12 Month Ret 0.161 0.132 0.029*** 
12 Month Excess Ret -0.010 -0.035 0.025*** 
Holding Period Ret (bps) 20.450 0.122 20.327*** 
Holding Period Excess Ret (bps) 10.756 -6.564 17.32*** 
Holding Period Net Ret (bps) 7.077 -10.950 18.027*** 
Holding Period Net Excess Ret (bps) -2.617 -17.636 15.019*** 
Amortized Spread (bps) 0.675 2.202 -1.527*** 
Amortized Commission (bps) 12.697 8.870 3.827*** 
Holding Period 100 157 -57*** 
Panel B: All Observations 
  Positive Negative Positive - Negative 
1 Month Ret 0.018 0.017 0.001** 
1 Month Excess Ret -0.001 -0.002 0.002** 
6 Month Ret 0.079 0.070 0.009*** 
6 Month Excess Ret -0.010 -0.019 0.009*** 
12 Month Ret 0.162 0.146 0.016*** 
12 Month Excess Ret -0.009 -0.027 0.018*** 
Holding Period Ret (bps) 16.909 4.125 12.785*** 
Holding Period Excess Ret (bps) 7.621 -3.542 11.163*** 
Holding Period Net Ret (bps) 4.228 -7.570 11.798*** 
Holding Period Net Excess Ret (bps) -5.060 -15.236 10.176*** 
Amortized Spread (bps) 0.942 2.259 -1.317*** 
Amortized Commission (bps) 11.739 9.435 2.304*** 
Holding Period 116 147 -32*** 
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Table 2.10: Common Demand for Liquidity 
 
This table reports correlation statistics from three different simulations that test for a systemic component 
in the demand for liquid assets across households.  A pair of non-overlapping investor groups containing N 
investors (where N = 500, 1,000 and 5,000) is selected from the dataset.  The normalized difference in the 
liquidity ranks of stocks the investors in each group purchase and sell each month are calculated (IlliqBSI 
variable in Equation 10).  IlliqBSI for each investor group is regressed on the market factor and the 
aggregate buy-sell imbalance to remove the common variation in all household trades unrelated to liquidity.  
A time series correlation of the residual from the regression is calculated between two groups of investors.  
The same procedure is repeated 5,000 times.  The summary statistics for the 5,000 simulated correlations 






































# of Investors Mean Median Std Dev t-value 
500 0.1782 0.1559 0.3005 41.95 
     
1000 0.2108 0.2409 0.2790 53.43 
     
5000 0.3799 0.3826 0.1636 164.18 
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Table 2.11: Illiquidity Rank of Transactions 
 
This table reports the differences in the adjusted illiquidity ranks of household purchases and sales of 
securities under different levels of aggregate market illiquidity.  Market illiquidity is calculated as the 
equal-weighted average of the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio of all stocks in a given month.  The sample 
period is broken into five equal time periods determined by the level of market illiquidity, ranked from 
‘Low’ to ‘High’ in the table.  ‘MAX’ is the month corresponding to the highest level of market illiquidity.  
Stocks are ranked each month based on the adjusted Amihud Illiquidity measure and assigned to percentile 
ranks.  The adjusted illiquidity rank of purchases and sales and the difference between purchases and sales 
are reported for five different levels of aggregate liquidity and for the month in which the market illiquidity 




Market Illiquidity Buy/Sell N Obs Adj Illiquidity Rank 
HH demeaned Adj 
Illiquidity Rank 
Low Buy 188,601 16.71 0.94 
  Sell 155,111 16.05 0.24 
  Diff   0.66*** 0.7*** 
          
2 Buy 226,817 15.87 0.29 
  Sell 185,471 15.86 -0.03 
  Diff   0.01 0.32*** 
          
3 Buy 186,929 16.00 0.43 
  Sell 155,989 15.44 -0.18 
  Diff   0.56*** 0.61*** 
          
4 Buy 244,573 15.97 0.36 
  Sell 201,018 15.44 -0.31 
  Diff   0.53*** 0.67*** 
          
High Buy 215,823 16.35 0.58 
  Sell 174,064 17.21 0.99 
  Diff   -0.86*** -0.41*** 
          
MAX Buy 11,436 14.94 -0.20 
  Sell 7,659 16.06 0.27 
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Table 2.12: Market Liquidity and Liquidity of Transactions 
 
This table reports the result of regressions using the illiquidity rank of the security that is purchased or sold 
as the dependent variable.  The independent variables are aggregate market illiquidity and investor income 
and wealth.  Market illiquidity is calculated as the equal-weighted average of the adjusted Amihud 
illiquidity ratio of all stocks in a given month.  MktIlliq is a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if 
the aggregate market illiquidity is in the lowest month during the sample time period.  Buy is a dummy 
variable that takes on a value of one if the transaction is a purchase.  Affluent is a dummy variable that 
takes on a value of one if the investor is in the highest income bracket (>$100,000) and has invested more 
than $100,000 in the stock market during the sample period.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
  Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
MktIlliq -0.8688 *** 0.0715 0.039 0.5357 
 0.1509 0.2380 0.2108 0.3710 
Buy  0.2892*** 0.2961*** 0.3174*** 
  0.0301 0.0267 0.0433 
Buy * MktIlliq  -1.5957*** -1.009*** -2.6296*** 
  0.3078 0.2710 0.4817 
Buy * MktIlliq * Affluent    2.1666*** 
    0.8313 
Affluent    -1.2371*** 
    0.0210 
Buy * Affluent    -0.7172 
    0.6384 
Affluent * MktIlliq    -0.2302*** 
    0.0782 
Adj R2 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 
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Figure 2.1: Illiquidity Ratio 
 
This figure shows the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio for IBM and Crown Petroleum Corp from Jan. 1991 
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Figure 2.2: Holding Periods of Households 
 
This figure shows the median holding period for various investor and stock groups.  Age is the age of the 
investor.  Account type denotes whether the account is a retirement account.  Investment value is the 
average amount invested by the household in the stock market.  A stock is defined as illiquid if it belongs to 
the lowest liquidity decile of stocks ranked according to the adjusted Amihud illiquidity ratio. The holding 
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Figure 2.3: Survival Probabilities 
 
This figure plots Kaplan-Meier survival probabilities for two groups of stocks held by households in the 
dataset.  Illiquid stocks in the figure are stocks that are in the highest illiquidity decile of stocks ranked 
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Figure 2.4: Hazard Ratios by Investor Sophistication 
 
This figure plots the hazard ratios on the AdjIlliq Dum variable for different groups of investors ranked by 
sophistication.  Hazard ratios are calculated by running a separate regression for each group of investors 
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Figure 2.5: Distribution of Holding Periods 
 
This figure plots the distribution of holding periods for the households in the dataset. Holding period is 
calculated as the average holding period for all the transactions of a given household.  Positions that are not 
closed-out by the end of the sample period are treated as censored observations.  A censored average is 
calculated assuming a Weibull distribution for the holding period.  The figure shows distribution of holding 
periods calculated using positions that are closed out by the end of the sample period (‘Closed’ line), and 
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Figure 2.6: BSI and Illiquidity BSI 
 
This figure plots the difference in the illiquidity ranks of buys and sells (IlliqBSI), and the aggregate level 
of market illiquidity (Mktilliq).  Market illiquidity is calculated as the equal-weighted average of the 
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Chapter III 
 
Is there a Distress Risk Anomaly? 
Corporate Bond Spread as a Proxy for Default Risk 
 
 A fundamental tenet of asset pricing is that investors should be compensated with 
higher returns for bearing systematic risk that can not be diversified.  Recently a number 
of papers examined whether default risk is such a systematic risk and whether it is priced 
in the cross section of equity returns.  On the theoretical side, default risk can be a priced 
factor if a firm’s Beta within the framework of the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
does not fully capture default-related risk.  Default risk may not be fully correlated with 
the market itself, but could be related to declines in other un-measured components of 
wealth such as human capital (Fama and French 1996) or risk related to debt securities 
(Ferguson and Shockley 2003), distinct from risk related to equities. Empirically, 
research thus far has focused on determining the ex-ante probability of firms failing to 
meet their financial obligations and testing to see if there is co-movement in security 
returns of firms in response to changes in an empirically constructed default risk factor.  
Previous studies have utilized different proxies and approaches to measure financial 
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distress and have found anomalously low returns for stocks with high probabilities of 
default.29  The low returns on stocks with high default risk cannot be explained by Fama 
and French (1993) risk factors. Stocks with high distress risk tend to have higher market 
betas and load more heavily on size and value factors leading to significantly negative 
alphas. 
In this paper we argue that the anomalous results documented in the literature are due 
to the poor quality of the proxies used to measure default risk.  First, previous papers 
measure financial distress by determining the ex-ante real-world probability of default, as 
opposed to risk-neutral probability of default that incorporates a risk premium for 
systematic risk.30 Ranking stocks on their real-world default probabilities, as done in 
Dichev (1998) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), implicitly assumes that high 
default probability stocks also have high exposure to the systematic component of default 
risk. George and Hwang (2009) show that a firm’s ex-ante real-world probability of 
default does not necessarily reflect the firm’s exposure to systematic default risk.  
Furthermore, it has been well documented (see for instance Almeida and Philippon 2007 
and Berndt et al. 2005) that there is a substantial difference between the risk-neutral and 
historical probabilities of default.  Second, previous papers have shown three stock 
characteristics – idiosyncratic volatility, leverage and profitability – to be most closely 
associated with high corporate default rates.  High idiosyncratic volatility, high leverage 
and low profitability predict high default probability.  However these are the same 
characteristics that are known to be associated with future expected returns. Within the q-
theory framework (Cochrane 1991, Liu, Whited and Zhang 2008), low profitability (more 
                                                 
29 See for instance Dichev (1998) and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008).  
30 Almeida and Philippon (2007), Hull, Predescu and White (2006) provide empirical evidence on the 
difference between real-world and risk-neutral default probabilities implied by credit spreads. 
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likely to default) firms have low expected future returns.  Similarly, firms with high 
leverage (more likely to default) and high idiosyncratic volatility (more likely to default) 
have low stock returns (Penman et al. 2007, Ang, Hodrick, Xing and Zhang 2008).  It is 
not clear if the distress anomaly is just the manifestation of one or more of these 
previously documented return relationships.  We show that the difference in returns 
between high and low distress stock portfolios becomes insignificant once we control for 
these three stock characteristics.   
   In this paper, we take a different approach to measuring default risk and use a 
market based measure, namely corporate bond spreads, to proxy for distress risk.  This 
measure offers several advantages over others that have been utilized in the literature thus 
far. Unlike structural models of corporate bankruptcy that make simplifying assumptions 
about the capital structure of a firm, our proposed measure is model and assumption free.  
And unlike stock characteristics used to measure default risk, which may reflect 
information about future returns unrelated to distress risk, credit spreads reflect the 
market consensus view of the credit quality of the underlying firm.  Moreover, credit 
spreads contain a risk-premium for systematic risk. As such, unlike previously used 
measures, credit spread, is a proxy for the market-implied risk-adjusted (or risk-neutral) 
probability of default and is a more complete measure of default risk. We show that credit 
spreads predict corporate defaults better than previously used measures based on 
structural models, bond ratings and accounting variables.  Using this market based 
measure, we find that there is no evidence of firms with high default risk delivering 
anomalously low returns, and we do not find default risk to be a priced risk factor in the 
cross-section of equity returns.   
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Ours is not the first paper to study the relationship between default risk and equity 
returns.  Dichev (1998) uses Altman’s z-score and Ohlson’s o-score to measure financial 
distress.  He finds a negative relationship between default risk and equity returns during 
the 1981-1995 time period.  In a related study, Griffin and Lemmon (2002), using the    
o-score to measure default risk, find that growth stocks with high probabilities of default 
have low returns.  Using a comprehensive set of accounting measures, Campbell, 
Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008) (hereafter CHS) show that stocks with high risk of default 
deliver anomalously low returns.  Garlappi, Shu, and Yan (2008), who obtain default risk 
measures from Moody’s KMV, also find similar results to those of Dichev (1998) and 
CHS (2008). They attribute their findings to the violation of the absolute priority rule. 
George and Hwang (2009) argue that the negative relation between returns and 
leverage can explain the pricing of distress risk anomaly.  Avramov et al. (2009) show 
that most of the negative return for high default risk stocks is concentrated around rating 
downgrades. Vassalou and Xing (2004) find some evidence that distressed stocks, mainly 
in the small value group, earn higher returns.31  Chava and Purnanandam (2008) argue 
that the poor performance of high distress stocks is limited to the post-1980 period when 
investors were positively surprised by defaults.  When they use implied cost of capital 
estimates from analysts' forecasts to proxy for ex-ante expected returns, they find a 
positive relation between default risk and expected returns.  
                                                 
31 Da and Gao (2005) argue that Vassalou and Xing’s results are limited to one month returns on stocks in 
the highest default likelihood group which trade at very low prices.  They show that returns are 
contaminated by microstructure noise and the positive one month return is compensation for increased 
liquidity risk. 
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Our paper also contributes to a growing literature on bankruptcy prediction.32  In 
particular, we show the importance of market based variables in predicting bankruptcy.  
Corporate bond spreads significantly increase the pseudo R2’s in hazard regressions when 
we run a horse race of corporate spreads with a comprehensive set of accounting 
measures, bond ratings and structural model parameters previously used in the literature.  
Adding corporate spread to the covariates used in CHS (2008), for instance, increases the 
pseudo R2 from 27.6% to 37.4%.33  These results strongly indicate that corporate bond 
spreads contain default information above and beyond the measures commonly used in 
the literature. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Sections 3.1 and 3.2 describe the data 
and the different default measures used in this study.  Section 3.3 reports the return 
analyses for high default risk stocks and examines the relationship between various stock 
characteristics and default risk.  Section 3.4 describes the use of credit spreads as a 
predictor of corporate bankruptcy and as a proxy for default risk, and also contains the 
asset pricing tests to see if default risk, as measured by credit spreads, is priced in the 
cross section of equity returns.  Section 3.5 concludes.   
 
3.1 Data 
 In this section, we briefly describe the data sources used in this study. Firm level 
accounting and price information are obtained from COMPUSTAT and CRSP for the 
1980–2008 time period. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000 through 6999) from 
                                                 
32 See for instance Altman (1968), Zmijewski (1984), Ohlson (1986), Shumway (2001), and Chava and 
Jarrow (2004). 
33 Using corporate spread as the lone predictor variable yields a pseudo R2 of 26.5%, similar to the pseudo 
R
2 obtained from using all of the CHS (2008) covariates.   
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the sample.   To avoid the influence of microstructure noise we also exclude firms priced 
less than one dollar in the analyses that follow.  The data items used to construct distress 
measures are explained in detail in the Appendix. 
Corporate defaults between 1981 and 2008 are identified from the Moody’s Default 
Risk Services’ Corporate Default database, SDC Platinum’s Corporate Restructurings 
database, Lynn M. LoPucki's Bankruptcy Research Database, and Shumway’s (2001) list 
of bankruptcies. We choose 1981 as the earliest year for identifying bankruptcy filings as 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 is likely to have caused the associations between 
accounting variables and the probability of bankruptcy to change. Furthermore, we have 
little corporate bond yield information prior to 1980. In all, we obtain a total of 548 firm 
defaults covering the period 1981–2008, for which we have complete accounting-based 
measures. 94 of these bankruptcies also have corresponding corporate bond spread 
information.   
Corporate bond data used in this study comes from three separate databases: the 
Lehman Brothers Fixed Income Database (Lehman) for the period 1974 to 1997, the 
Fixed Investment Securities Database (FISD) for the period 1998 to 2002, and the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) system dataset from 2003 to 2008. We also 
use the National Association of Insurance Commissioners Database (NAIC) for bond 
descriptions.  Due to the small number of observations prior to the year 1980, we include 
only the period 1980 to 2008 in the analyses that follow. 
Our sample includes all U.S. corporate bonds listed in the above datasets that satisfy a 
set of selection criteria commonly used in the corporate bond literature.34 We exclude all 
                                                 
34 See for instance Duffee (1999), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001) and Avramov et al. 
(2006). 
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bonds that are matrix-priced (rather than market-priced) from the sample. We remove all 
bonds with equity or derivative features (i.e. callable, puttable, and convertible bonds), 
bonds with warrants, and bonds with floating interest rates. Finally, we eliminate all 
bonds that have less than one year to maturity.   
For all selected bonds, we extract beginning of month credit spreads calculated as the 
difference between the corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched 
treasury rate.  There are a number of extreme observations for the variables constructed 
from the different bond datasets. To ensure that statistical results are not heavily 
influenced by outliers, we set all observations higher than the 99th percentile value of a 
given variable to the 99th percentile value. All values lower than the first percentile of 
each variable are winsorized in the same manner.  For each firm, we calculate a value-
weighted average of that firm’s outstanding bond spreads, using market values of the 
bonds as weights.  There are 107,692 firm months and 1011 unique firms with credit 
spread and firm level data.  There is no potential survivorship bias in our sample as we do 
not exclude bonds that have gone bankrupt or those that have matured.  
As not all companies issue bonds, it is important to discuss the limitations of our 
dataset.  We compute summary statistics for default measures and financial 
characteristics of the companies in our bond sample and for all companies in CRSP.  
These results are summarized in Table 3.1.  Not surprisingly, companies in the bond 
sample are larger and show a slight growth tilt.  There is, however, significant dispersion 
in size, market-to-book, and credit spread values.  The bond sample covers a small 
portion of the total number of companies, but a substantial portion in terms of total 
market capitalization.  For instance, in the year 1997, the number of firms with active 
  69 
bonds in our sample constitutes about 4% of all the firms in the market.  However, in 
terms of market capitalization, the dataset captures about 40% of aggregate equity market 
value in 1997.  In section 3.3, we show that the distress anomaly as described by CHS 
(2008) and others exists in our bond sample.   
 
3.2 Default Risk Measures 
 There is a vast literature on the statistical modeling of the probability of bankruptcy.  
In this paper, we create measures of financial distress based on three models of 
bankruptcy prediction that have been utilized by previous researchers investigating the 
pricing of distress risk.     
 
3.2.1 Static Models 
 Static models of bankruptcy prediction use firm specific accounting information, 
employing either a multiple discriminant analysis as in Altman (1968) or a conditional 
logit model as in Ohlson (1980), in order to assess which firm characteristics are 
important in determining the probability of financial distress.  These models then use the 
estimates from the single period classification to predict future implied probability of 
bankruptcy.35   In this paper, we use Altman’s z-score and Ohlson’s o-score, two popular 
frameworks that have been widely used in empirical research and practice.  Altman’s z-
score is defined as the following: 
 
z-score = 1.2 1.4 3.3 0.6 1.0 WCTA RETA EBITTA METL STA+ + + +   (3.1) 
 
                                                 
35 Using single period observations introduce a bias in static models as discussed in Shumway (2001). 
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where  WCTA is the ratio of working capital to total assets, RETA is the ratio of retained 
earnings to total assets, EBITTA is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total 
assets, METL is the ratio of market equity to total liabilities, and STA is the ratio of sales 
to total assets. Ohlson’s o-score is defined as: 
 
-score 1.32 0.407 log( ) 6.03 1.43 
0.076 1.72 2.37 1.83 
0.285 0.521 
o SIZE TLTA WCTA
CLCA OENEG NITA FUTL
INTWO CHIN
= − − + −
+ − − −
+ −
          (3.2) 
 
where SIZE is total assets divided by the consumer price index, TLTA is the ratio of total 
liabilities to total assets, CLCA is the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, OENEG 
is a dummy variable equal to one if total liabilities exceeds total assets and zero 
otherwise, NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets, FUTL is the ratio of funds from 
operations to total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one if net income was 
negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, and CHIN is a measure of the change 
in net income.  The accounting variables used to construct the z-score and the o-score are 
described in detail in the appendix. 
 
3.2.2 Dynamic Models 
 Dynamic models of bankruptcy prediction (Shumway 2001, Chava and Jarrow 2004 
and CHS 2008) use a dynamic panel model approach and incorporate market based 
variables such as market capitalization and past equity returns. Dynamic models of 
bankruptcy prediction avoid the biases of the static models by adjusting for potential 
duration dependence issues.   In this paper we use the CHS (2008) specification: 
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-   9.164 20.264 1.416 
7.129 1.411 0.045 




CHS score NIMTAAVG TLMTA
EXRETAVG SIGMA RSIZE
CASHMTA MB PRICE
= − − +
− + −
− + −
  (3.3) 
 
where NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net 
income to the market value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the 
market value of total assets, EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly 
log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index, SIGMA is the standard deviation 
of daily stock returns over the previous three months, RSIZE is the log ratio of market 
capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to 
the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, PRICE is the log price 
per share truncated from above at $15.36 
 
3.2.3 Structural Model 
 The third measure we use in this study is based on the structural default model of 
Merton (1974). This approach treats the equity value of a company as a call option on the 
company’s assets.  The probability of bankruptcy is based on the “distance-to-default” 
measure, which is the difference between the asset value of the firm and the face value of 
its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of the firm’s asset value.  There are a number of 
different approaches to calculating the distance-to-default measure. We follow CHS 
(2008) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) in constructing this measure, the details of which are 
provided in the appendix. 
                                                 
36 In computing the CHS-score, we use coefficients on the variables calculated from rolling regressions to 
avoid a look-ahead bias.  We thank Jens Hilscher for providing this data. 
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3.3 Pricing of Default Risk 
3.3.1 Returns to Distressed Stocks 
 In this section we analyze the effect of default risk on stock returns. We sort stocks 
into deciles each January from 1981 through 2008, according to their default probabilities 
calculated using the CHS hazard model, Ohlson’s o-score, and Merton’s distance-to-
default measure.37  In the analyses that follow, we exclude financial firms (SIC codes 
6000 through 6999); we also exclude firms priced less than one dollar as of the portfolio 
formation date from the sample to avoid the influence of microstructure noise.  The 
stocks in each decile portfolio are held for a year.  Following CHS (2008), if a delisting 
return is available we use the delisting return, otherwise we use the last available return in 
CRSP.  We repeat the same analyses for stocks in our bond dataset.  To save space we 
only report returns for the top and bottom, and the difference between top and bottom 
deciles.   
We compute the value-weighted return for these decile portfolios on a monthly basis 
and regress the portfolio return in excess of the risk-free rate on the market (MKT), size 
(SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors: 
 
r = i i i i i i i
t MKT t SMB t HML t MOM t t
MKT SMB HML MOMα β β β β ε+ + + + +   (3.4) 
 
The results are reported in Table 3.2.  Panels A, B, C show returns for default risk 
portfolios calculated using the CHS hazard model, Ohlson’s o-score, and Merton’s 
                                                 
37 We obtain similar results using Altman’s z-score, which are not reported to save space.  
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distance-to-default measure respectively.  The results under ‘Bond Sample’ on the right 
hand side include only the companies in our bond sample.   
Our results are consistent with those obtained in the previous studies. Stocks in the 
highest default risk portfolio have significant negative returns.  Using the CHS default 
probability, the difference in returns between the highest and lowest default risk 
portfolios is -1.24% per month.  The intercepts from the market and the 4-factor model 
are economically and statistically significant.  Monthly alpha for the zero cost portfolio 
formed by going long on stocks in the highest default risk decile and short on stocks in 
the lowest default risk decile is -0.83% per month.  We find similar results using 
Merton’s distance-to-default measure (monthly 4-factor alpha equal to -0.62%), and 
Ohlson’s o-score (monthly 4-factor alpha equal to -1.28%) to form default risk portfolios.  
The results are weaker for the bond sample, but still economically and statistically 
significant.  The 4-factor monthly alphas for the high minus low zero cost default risk 
portfolios are   -0.32%, -0.10% and -0.24% using the CHS hazard model, Ohlson’s o-
score, and Merton’s distance-to-default measure respectively.   
The loadings on the size and value factors suggest that distressed stocks are mostly 
small and value stocks.  The loading on the momentum factor is consistent with the 
intuition that distressed stocks tend to have low returns prior to portfolio formation.  
These results are consistent across different measures of distress, and the results hold in 
our bond sample.  
 
  74 
3.3.2 Stock Characteristics and Distress Returns 
 Previous research has identified a number of stock characteristics that predict high 
default probabilities for companies.  However, three characteristics – leverage, 
idiosyncratic volatility and profitability – have been shown to be most closely associated 
with corporate default rates.  High leverage, high idiosyncratic volatility and low 
profitability predict higher rates corporate default.  As mentioned earlier, these are the 
same characteristics that are ex-ante associated with low future returns.  Ang, Hodrick, 
Xing and Zhang (2006, 2008) establish a robust relationship between idiosyncratic 
volatility and stock returns. This negative relationship has been termed the ‘idiosyncratic 
volatility puzzle’, since rational asset pricing theories predict that the relationship be 
positive or that there be no relationship at all.38  There have been some behavioral and 
agency-based explanations for the negative relationship between idiosyncratic volatility 
returns.39  Penman et al. (2007) show a negative relationship between leverage and stock 
returns – the leverage anomaly.  Similarly, low profitability predicts low returns.  Q-
theory provides the theoretical link between profitability and equity returns (Cochrane 
1991, Liu, Whited and Zhang 2008).  It is not clear if distress anomaly is just an 
amalgamation of one or more of these previously documented return relationships. In this 
section we investigate in detail the relationship between default risk and these three stock 
characteristics.  In particular we want to see if the distress anomaly persists once we 
explicitly control for idiosyncratic volatility, profitability and leverage.  
                                                 
38 Merton (1987), Malkiel and Xu (2002) and Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) link higher returns on high- 
volatility stocks to investors not being able to diversify.  
39 The behavioral model of Barberis and Huang (2001) predicts that higher idiosyncratic volatility stocks 
should earn higher expected returns. Falkenstein (1996) reports that mutual fund managers prefer to hold 
more volatile stocks for the upside option value they provide. 
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 To control for these three stock characteristics, we perform a double sort.  We sort 
stocks into five groups each January from 1981 to 2008 according to the CHS probability 
of default. Then within each distress group we sort stocks based on the previous year’s 
stock characteristic (idiosyncratic volatility, profitability or leverage) into five groups, 
creating a total of 25 portfolios.  We then calculate 4-factor alphas for the distress 
portfolios after controlling for the effects of the characteristics.  We do this by averaging 
the returns of the five distress portfolios over each of the characteristic portfolios.  We 
use NIMTAAVG as the profitability measure and TLMTA as the leverage measure.  Both 
variables are described in Section 3.2.  We follow AHXZ (2006) and calculate 
idiosyncratic volatility relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model.  First, we regress 
daily stock returns from the previous calendar year on the Fama-French 3 factors: 
 
 r = i i i i i i
t MKT t SMB t HML t t
MKT SMB HMLα β β β ε+ + + +                (3.5) 
 
Idiosyncratic volatility is then calculated as the standard deviation of the residuals: 
( )var itε . 
Panel A of Table 3.3 reports 4-factor alphas for the five distress portfolios, as well as 
4-factor alphas for the distress portfolios after controlling for the three stock 
characteristics.  We also report in Panel B of Table 3.3, average idiosyncratic volatility, 
leverage and profitability values for firms belonging to each of the five distress 
portfolios.  There is a strong relationship between distress risk and the three stock 
characteristics.  Idiosyncratic volatility increases monotonically from 2.5% for the lowest 
distress group to 4.5% for the highest group.  Leverage increases from 0.22 for the lowest 
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distress group to 0.61 for the highest distress group.  Similarly, profitability for the lowest 
distress group is 1.2% and decreases monotonically to -1.1%.  The unconditional 4-factor 
alpha for the zero cost portfolio formed by going long high distress stocks and shorting 
low distress stocks is -0.88% per month, yet this premium decreases to -0.61% after 
controlling for leverage.  Once we control for idiosyncratic volatility, the return spread 
between high and low distress stocks reduces to -0.54%.  Finally, controlling for 
profitability reduces the spread to -0.26% per month making it statistically insignificant.  
These results suggest that the return to high minus low distressed stock portfolios can be 
attributed to idiosyncratic volatility, leverage and profitability.  The results are consistent 
with the notion that the distress risk anomaly is an amalgamation of other anomalies and 
return relationships previously documented in the literature.  
  
3.4 Credit Spreads As a Measure of Default Risk 
 Given the results in the previous section, instead of using stock characteristics to 
measure financial distress, we take a different approach and use yields on corporate 
bonds in excess of the treasury rate to measure ex-ante probability of default.  As 
mentioned earlier, this measure offers several advantages over others that have been used 
by previous papers.  It is available in high frequency, which increases the power of 
statistical analyses we carry out.  Unlike structural models of corporate bankruptcy that 
make simplifying assumptions about the capital structure of a firm, our proposed measure 
is model and assumption free.  And unlike stock characteristics used to measure default 
risk, which may reflect information about future returns unrelated to distress risk, credit 
spreads reflect the market consensus view of the credit quality of the underlying firm. 
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There is now a significant body of theoretical research that shows that default-risk 
constitutes a considerable portion of credit spreads.  Elton et al. (2001) report that default 
risk in credit spreads accounts for 19% to 41% of the spread level depending on company 
rating. Driessen (2005) also finds that default risk accounts for at the minimum18% (AA 
rated bonds) and as high as 52% (BBB rated bonds) of the corporate bond spread. Huang 
and Huang (2003) using the Longstaff-Schwartz model find that distress risk accounts for 
39%, 34%, 41%, 73%, and 93% of the corporate bond spread respectively for bonds rated 
Aa, A, Baa, Ba and B. Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2005) use the information in credit 
default swaps (CDS) to obtain direct measures of the size of the default and non-default 
components in corporate spreads.  They find that the default component represents 51% 
of the spread for AAA/AA rated bonds, 56% for A-rated bonds, 71% for BBB-rated 
bonds, and 83% for BB-rated bonds. The similarity in the information content of CDS 
spreads and bond credit spreads with respect to default is supported by Zhu (2005).  He 
confirms, through co-integration tests, that the theoretical parity relationship between 
these two types of credit spreads holds as a long run equilibrium condition.40 
 
3.4.1 Credit Spreads and Bankruptcy Prediction 
 Consistent with the studies discussed above, in this section we empirically show that 
bond spreads are a good ex-ante predictor of corporate defaults.  In particular, we test to 
see if credit spreads improve default prediction beyond measures previously used in the 
                                                 
40 In this study we have chosen to use bond spreads instead of CDS spreads because bond data is available 
for a substantially larger number of companies and is available for a much longer time period. 
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literature.41 To measure the probability that a firm defaults, we estimate a dynamic 
panel model using a logit specification, following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow 
(2004), CHS (2008) and others.  We use information available at the end of the calendar 
year to predict defaults twelve months ahead. Specifically, the marginal probability of 
default (PD) for company i over the next year t is assumed to follow a logistic 
distribution: 
 









Xα β ′+ − −
                                                (3.6) 
 
where X is a vector of explanatory variables available at the time of prediction, and 
includes a comprehensive list of explanatory variables that have been used by previous 
papers to predict corporate bankruptcy.   We use accounting variables used in calculating 
Altman’s z-score, Ohlson’s o-score, market based variables used by Shumway (2001) 
and CHS (2008), as well as Merton’s distance-to-default measure.  We also use Standard 
and Poor’s (S&P) corporate ratings obtained from COMPUSTAT.  All the variables used 
in the hazard regressions that follow are described in detail in the Appendix.   
Table 3.5 reports results for the first set of hazard regressions.  In the first column, 
we use the same covariates (NIMTAVG, TLMTA, EXRETAVG, SIGMA, RSIZE, 
CASHMTA, MB and PRICE) used in CHS (2008).  The sample includes only firms that 
have issued bonds for the 1980 to 2008 time period.  As a comparison, we report the 
estimates using the full sample (including firms that have not issued bonds), and also 
                                                 
41 Bharath and Shumway (2008) document that credit spreads contain useful information in predicting 
defaults.  In this paper, we significantly increase the number of defaults used in the hazard regressions, and 
also include a comprehensive list of alternative explanatory variables. 
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estimates from the CHS (2008) study in columns 7 and 6 respectively.  The estimates 
from these three samples are very similar indicating that the bond dataset is not biased.  
When we use Merton’s distance-to-default (DD) measure as a predictor, we obtain 
similar results to those in CHS (2008).  Results from this regression are reported in 
column 4.  
Next, we add corporate spreads (SPREAD) as an additional covariate to the CHS 
(2008) and the Merton specifications.  The estimates from these two regressions are 
reported in columns 2 and 5 respectively.  We also report estimates from a regression 
using SPREAD as the only covariate in column 3.  Our proposed measure improves the 
explanatory power of both the CHS and Merton models.  We report McFadden’s pseudo 
R
2 coefficients for each regression.42  The pseudo R2 value increases from 27.6% for the 
CHS model to 37.4% for the CHS model used in conjunction with SPREAD in predicting 
bankruptcies.  The specification that uses SPREAD alone has a pseudo R2 coefficient of 
26.5% which is similar to the pseudo R2 for the CHS specification.  Pseudo R2 improves 
from 24.1% to 30.4% when Merton’s DD is used in conjunction with SPREAD.   
We also investigate whether it is appropriate to use corporate bond ratings as a 
measure of default risk. Many studies in this literature, including Avramov et al. (2006a), 
use corporate bond ratings as a proxy for distress risk. In this paper we show that 
SPREAD and RATING are not perfect substitutes.  In fact, in Table 3.4 we show that 
there is much variation in credit spreads within a rating group.  The correlation between 
credit spreads and ratings is only 0.45. AA- bonds, for instance, have an average credit 
spread of 84.30 basis points with a standard deviation of 43.93 basis points.  A one 
                                                 
42 McFadden’s pseudo R2 is calculated as 1 − L1/L0, where L1 is the log likelihood of the estimated model 
and L0 is the log likelihood of a null model that includes only a constant term. 
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standard deviation move in credit spreads would firmly take an AA- bond’s rating to a 
BBB+ rating which is 4 rating levels down. These results indicate that measuring default 
risk through company ratings can yield misleading results.  This intuition is further 
supported by hazard regressions in columns 8 and 9 of Table 3.5. Pseudo R2 improves 
from 23.6% to 30.5% when RATING is used in conjunction with SPREAD.   
Table 3.6 further shows that adding SPREAD to Altman and Ohlson specifications 
have similar effects in improving the pseudo R2 values.  SPREAD enters with positive 
sign and has high statistical significance when used in conjunction with either of the 
models. Finally when we include all of the variables in Table 3.7, SPREAD enters with 
the expected sign and statistical significance while significantly improving the pseudo R2.  
The analyses suggest that credit spread is an important predictor of corporate defaults and 
contains information related to financial distress not found in other measures commonly 
used in the literature. 
 
3.4.2 Credit Spreads and Firm Characteristics  
 To see how corporate bond spreads are related to firm characteristics we form 
portfolios based on credit spreads.  Each month from January 1981 through December 
2008, companies in our sample are ranked and put into three portfolios based on the value 
of their credit spreads in the previous month.  As described earlier, credit spreads are 
value-weighted averages of firms’ outstanding bond spreads in a given month. For each 
portfolio, we calculate average book-to-market, size, momentum, and beta values for all 
the companies in that portfolio in a given month.  Table 3.8 reports summary statistics for 
firm characteristics and value-weighted average monthly returns for credit spread 
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portfolios.  Credit spreads vary negatively with firm size and positively with book-to-
market. The relationship with momentum is not monotonic, but the difference in past 
returns between the low and the high credit spread portfolios is positive and significant.  
In contrast to earlier studies, we find that equity returns increase monotonically with 
credit spreads.  
 
3.4.3 Credit Spreads and Equity Returns 
 In this section we examine how corporate bond spreads are related to future realized 
equity returns.  In particular we test whether stocks with high default risk as measured by 
credit spreads have anomalously low returns after controlling for standard risk factors.  In 
the analyses that follow, we create two related but distinct proxies of credit risk.  First, 
we use credit spreads, calculated as the difference between the corporate bond yield and 
the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate, to proxy for aggregate default risk. 
Second, we use credit spreads that are net of expected losses to proxy for each firm’s 
exposure to the systematic component of default risk.  
In order to calculate credit spreads that are net of expected losses we adopt a 
procedure used by Driessen et al. (2007), Elton et al. (2001) and Campello, Chen and 
Zhang (2004):  
 
( ) ( )1 1 1 1t tNetSpread PD L PD Spread   = × − + − × + −              (3.7) 
 
In Equation (7), NetSpread is the corporate bond spread net of expected losses, PD is the 
physical probability of default, L is the loss rate in the event of default, and Spread is the 
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corporate bond credit spread calculated as the difference between the corporate bond 
yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate. In Equation (7), we assume 
that default losses are incurred at maturity.  We use CHS-score described in Section 3.2 
to calculate physical probabilities of default.  We follow Elton et al. (2001) and Driessen 
et al. (2007), and use historical loss rates reported in Altman and Kishmore (1998) by 
rating category.  The loss rates vary from 32% for AAA-rated firms to 62% for CCC-
rated firms. 
We sort stocks into deciles each January from 1981 through 2008, according to the 
two distress measures calculated using corporate spreads. The stocks in each decile 
portfolio are held for a year.  As before, if a delisting return is available we use the 
delisting return, otherwise we use the last available return in CRSP.  To save space we 
only report returns for the top and bottom, and the difference between top and bottom 
deciles.  The return results are reported in Table 3.9.  The results under ‘Bond Spreads’ 
on the left hand side use credit spreads calculated as the difference between the corporate 
bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate. The results under 
‘Bond Spreads In Excess of Expected Losses’ on the right hand side use credit spreads 
that are net of expected losses.  
Our results challenge those obtained in the previous studies. Using credit spreads, as 
a measure of default risk, the difference in raw returns between the highest and lowest 
default risk portfolios is 0.129% per month and statistically insignificant.  The intercepts 
from the market and the 4-factor models are also economically and statistically 
insignificant.  We find similar results when firms are sorted based on their exposures to 
the systematic component of default risk. The 4-factor monthly alphas for a portfolio 
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formed by going long stocks in the highest distress portfolio and short stocks in the 
lowest distress risk portfolio are -0.208% and -0.156% using credit spreads and using 
credit spreads net of expected losses respectively.   
There is a positive relationship between credit spreads and raw equity returns, but the 
return of the high minus low credit spread portfolio is not statistically significant. CAPM 
and the Carhart 4-factor regressions show that alphas are further subsumed in all credit 
spread portfolios suggesting that default risk is captured mainly by the market factor and 
partly by the size and the value factors.  The size and value factors have statistically 
significant positive loadings for the highest credit risk portfolio, using either measure, 
suggesting that these factors are related to default risk. In 4-factor regressions the 
momentum factor has a negative and statistically significant loading in the highest credit 
risk portfolio regressions, consistent with the notion that poor performers of the past are 
likely to be today’s distressed firms.   
Ranking stocks on their real-world default probabilities, as done in Dichev (1998) 
and Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi (2008), implicitly assumes that high default 
probability stocks also have high exposure to the systematic component of default risk. 
Using corporate spreads we explicitly account for the systematic component in the risk of 
distress. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to explicitly rank equity returns 
according to firms’ exposures to the systematic component of default risk. Overall, the 
results suggest that there is no evidence of default risk being negatively priced.  
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3.4.4 Robustness Checks 
 As we are using average spreads for each firm, to ensure that our results are not biased 
one way or another, in this section we consider the impact of bond liquidity and maturity 
on bond spreads and equity returns.  We use some of the proxies utilized by Longstaff et 
al. (2005) in their study to measure corporate bond liquidity.43  A dummy variable is 
given each month a value of one or zero depending on the characteristics of the 
underlying bond.  We then add up the dummy variables to come up with an overall 
liquidity score.  The first proxy is used to measure general availability of the bond issue 
in the market.  If the outstanding market value of a bond is larger than the median market 
value of all bonds, then the dummy variable is assigned a value of one.  The second 
proxy is the age of the bond and parallels the notion of on-the-run and off-the-run bonds 
in treasury markets, with on-the-run bonds being more liquid.  If the age of a bond is less 
than the median age of all bonds, then the dummy variable is assigned a value of one.  
The third proxy is the time to maturity of the bond.  It has been shown that there are 
maturity clienteles for corporate bonds and that shorter-maturity corporate bonds tend to 
be more liquid than longer-maturity bonds.  If the time to maturity of a bond is less than 
seven years then the dummy variable is assigned a value of one. The fourth proxy that we 
use is a dummy variable for bonds rated by major rating agencies such as S&P and 
Moody’s.  If a bond is rated, then it is more likely to be liquid and the dummy variable is 
assigned a value of one.  The maximum liquidity value assigned to a bond is four and the 
minimum liquidity value is zero.  
                                                 
43 For a small subset of our sample, we have bid-ask, volume and turnover information.  We carried out 
similar analyses described in this section and arrived at the same conclusions.  
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We divide our sample into three liquidity groups based on the liquidity score, and 
calculate average spread and one month ahead equity returns.  The average spread for 
illiquid bonds is 50 basis points higher than for liquid bonds, and the difference is 
statistically significant.  The differential for equity returns, on the other hand, is relatively 
small and insignificant.  Portfolio returns are summarized in Table 3.10.   In the monthly 
portfolios one can observe that the difference in raw returns between the highest and 
lowest default risk portfolios as well as the intercepts from the market and the 4-factor 
models for the high minus low credit risk portfolios are economically and statistically 
insignificant.  This is true regardless of whether the underlying bonds are liquid or 
illiquid.  These results indicate that liquidity effects are unlikely to be driving our 
findings. 
As there are differences in values and variation in spreads across different bond 
maturities, in an effort to understand if the pricing of default risk varies across maturities, 
we split our sample into four maturity buckets: 1 to 4, 4 to 7, 7 to 11, and greater than 11 
years.  For each firm we calculate a weighted (by market value) average of bond spread 
within each time-to-maturity group.  We carry out our analyses for each maturity bucket 
treating each company–maturity spread as a separate observation. We form three equally 
weighted portfolios of equity returns based on credit spread in each maturity group 
considered. Summary statistics of equity returns for company–maturity bucket / spread 
portfolios are reported in Table 3.11. In all time-to-maturity buckets, the difference in 
raw returns between the highest and lowest default risk portfolios as well as the intercepts 
from the market and the 4-factor models for the high minus low credit risk portfolios are 
economically and statistically insignificant.  Since the uniform ranking of equity portfolio 
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returns with respect to credit spreads yield similar patterns across different time-to-




 In this paper we examine the pricing of default risk in equity returns.  Our contribution 
to this literature is three-fold.  First, we show that the distress risk anomaly is an 
amalgamation of other anomalies and return relationships previously documented in the 
literature.  Second, ours is the first paper to use corporate bond spreads to measure the ex-
ante probability of default risk.  We show that in hazard rate regressions, credit spreads 
drive out the significance of most of the other measures that are used to predict corporate 
defaults and significantly improve the pseudo R2 values in all specifications.  Third, 
contrary to previous findings, we show that default risk is not priced negatively in the 
cross section of equity returns. We sort firms according to their exposures to the 
systematic component of default risk as well as their aggregate default risk.  To the best 
of our knowledge we are the first to explicitly rank equity returns according to firms’ 
exposures to the systematic component of default risk.  Portfolios sorted both on credit 
spreads and on credit spreads net of expected losses have positive raw returns but do not 
deliver significant positive or negative returns after controlling for well known risk 
factors. Our findings challenge the previous studies that have found an anomalous 
relationship between credit risk and equity returns. The analyses in this paper take the 
right step towards finding a more appropriate measure of systematic default risk that can 
explain the cross section of equity returns in line with the rational expectations theory. 
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Table 3.3: Stock Characteristics and Default Risk 
 
Table 3.3 shows the 4-factor alphas for distress portfolios before and after controlling for idiosyncratic 
volatility, profitability and leverage. Distress portfolios are formed by sorting stocks into five groups 
each January from 1981 to 2008 according to the CHS probability of default.  Then within each default 
group we first sort stocks based on the previous year’s idiosyncratic volatility into five groups creating a 
total of 25 portfolios. The five distress portfolios are averaged over each of the idiosyncratic volatility 
portfolios to account for the impact of idiosyncratic volatility. Finally we calculate the 4-factor alphas for 
the distress portfolios as well as the high distress-low distress hedge portfolio. The same procedure is 
repeated for profitability and leverage characteristics and we report only the 4-factor alphas for distress 
portfolios as well as hedge portfolios that have been controlled for the effects of the aforementioned 
stock characteristics. Idiosyncratic volatility is calculated relative to the Fama-French 3-factor model as 
in AHXZ (2006). Profitability is measured using NIMTAVG, and leverage is measured using TLMTA.  
NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market 
value of total assets, and TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets. 
Absolute values of t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Panel A: 4-Factor Returns 
4-Factor Alphas (*100) Before/After Controlling for Stock Characteristics 
  L 2 3 4 H H-L 
0.079 0.133 0.014 -0.158 -0.803 -0.882 
Before controls 
-0.71 (1.94)* -0.13 -1.03 (3.29)*** (2.71)*** 
        
-0.091 -0.219 -0.304 -0.279 -0.627 -0.537 
Controlling for Idio Volatility 
-0.62 (1.88)* (2.73)*** (2.01)** (3.17)*** (2.08)** 
        
0.012 -0.104 -0.006 0.008 -0.251 -0.263 
Controlling for Profitability 
(0.14) (1.89)* (0.08) (0.08) (1.74)* (1.39) 
        
0.072 -0.006 0.004 -0.122 -0.545 -0.617 
Controlling for Leverage 
(0.98) (0.1)* (0.05) (1.1) (3.01)*** (2.93)*** 
       
Panel B: Stock Characteristics 
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.032 0.045 0.019 
Profitability 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.001 -0.011 -0.022 
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Table 3.4: Credit spread by rating categories 
 
Table 3.4 reports summary statistics for credit spreads by rating category. The benchmark risk-free yield is 
the yield of the closest maturity treasury. We include only straight fixed-coupon corporate bonds for the 
January 1974-December 2008 time period. Bonds for financial firms are excluded. The spreads are given in 






Mean Spread (bps) 
Std Dev Spread 
(bps) 
AAA 1157 64.30 27.47 
AA+ 316 87.58 32.07 
AA 2973 77.51 35.70 
AA- 2966 84.30 43.93 
A+ 5155 96.99 45.77 
A 7778 102.28 51.99 
A- 5397 112.24 61.65 
BBB+ 4801 124.45 67.24 
BBB 4882 146.47 88.86 
BBB- 3559 185.86 113.99 
BB+ 1224 272.54 142.87 
BB 949 321.31 134.27 
BB- 709 384.52 142.45 
B+ 342 405.91 129.51 
B 266 448.77 156.50 
B- 57 508.09 148.10 
CCC+ 34 455.60 117.19 
CCC 29 583.79 116.17 
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Table 3.5: Bankruptcy Prediction – CHS Covariates, Ratings and Distance-to-
Default 
 
Table 3.5 reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables.  
NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market 
value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets, EXRETAVG is 
a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index, 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months, RSIZE is the log 
ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to 
the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, PRICE is the log price per share truncated 
from above at $15.  These variables are described in detail in the appendix.  Rating is the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) corporate rating obtained from COMPUSTAT. Results under ‘All Firms’ are estimates 
computed using the full sample of defaults with available accounting information.  Results under ‘Firms 
with bonds’ are estimates computed using the sample of defaults from companies that have issued bonds 
with available accounting information.  Results under ‘CHS sample’ shows the estimates CHS report in 
their paper.  Absolute values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  
McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 










 (8) (9) (10) (10) (11) (12) 
Sample 
period: 
1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 
NIMTAAVG     -15.667 -12.039 
      (1.28) (1.40) 
TLMTA       1.890   1.205 
      (1.60)      (2.34)** 
EXRETAVG     -15.753 -16.015 
     
       
(4.31)*** 
        
(5.34)*** 
SIGMA     0.692  0.037 
     (0.84) (0.43) 
RSIZE     -0.233 -0.330 
     (1.09) (1.09) 
CASHMTA     -2.064 -2.657 
     (1.11) (1.11) 
MB     -0.009  0.055 
     (0.27) (0.27) 
PRICE     0.022   0.188 
     (0.31) (0.31) 
SPREAD  17.870  15.229  14.600 
       (6.43)***  
      
(4.34)*** 
 
       
(3.19)*** 
DD   -0.666 -0.556 -0.260  -0.302 
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        (5.70)*** 
      
(6.14)*** 
  (1.74)*   (1.78)* 




    (6.98)***     (2.47)** (0.30) (1.12) (0.15) 




    (18.90)***      (3.78)*** 
     
(4.21)*** 
     
(3.07)*** 
      (2.74)*** 
Observations 8068 8068 6814 6814 6736 6736 
Bankruptcies 77 77 51 51 51 51 




Firms with  
Bonds 
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Table 3.5 continued: Bankruptcy Prediction – Ratings, Spreads and Distance-to-
Default 
 
Table 3.5 reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables. 
NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net income to the market 
value of total assets, TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities to the market value of total assets, EXRETAVG is 
a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns relative to the S&P 500 index, 
SIGMA is the standard deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months, RSIZE is the log 
ratio of market capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index, CASHMTA is the ratio of cash to 
the market value of total assets, MB is the market-to-book ratio, PRICE is the log price per share truncated 
from above at $15.  These variables are described in detail in the appendix.  Rating is the Standard and 
Poor’s (S&P) corporate rating obtained from COMPUSTAT. Results under ‘All Firms’ are estimates 
computed using the full sample of defaults with available accounting information.  Results under ‘Firms 
with bonds’ are estimates computed using the sample of defaults from companies that have issued bonds 
with available accounting information. .  Results under ‘CHS sample’ shows the estimates CHS report in 
their paper.  Absolute values of z-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  
McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 (8) (9) (10) (10) (11) (12) 
Sample 
period: 
1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 
NIMTAAVG     -15.667 -12.039 
      (1.28) (1.40) 
TLMTA       1.890   1.205 
      (1.60)      (2.34)** 
EXRETAVG     -15.753 -16.015 
     
       
(4.31)*** 
        
(5.34)*** 
SIGMA     0.692  0.037 
     (0.84) (0.43) 
RSIZE     -0.233 -0.330 
     (1.09) (1.09) 
CASHMTA     -2.064 -2.657 
     (1.11) (1.11) 
MB     -0.009  0.055 
     (0.27) (0.27) 
PRICE     0.022   0.188 
     (0.31) (0.31) 
SPREAD  17.870  15.229  14.600 
       (6.43)***  
      
(4.34)*** 
 
       
(3.19)*** 
DD   -0.666 -0.556 -0.260  -0.302 
        (5.70)*** 
      
(6.14)*** 
  (1.74)*   (1.78)* 




    (6.98)***     (2.47)** (0.30) (1.12) (0.15) 




    (18.90)***      (3.78)*** 
     
(4.21)*** 
     
(3.07)*** 
      (2.74)*** 
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Observations 8068 8068 6814 6814 6736 6736 
Bankruptcies 77 77 51 51 51 51 




Firms with  
Bonds 
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Table 3.6: Bankruptcy Prediction – Altman and Ohlson Covariates 
 
Table 3.6 reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables. WCTA is 
the ratio of working capital to total assets, RETA is the ratio of retained earnings to total assets, EBITTA is 
the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to total assets, METL is the ratio of market equity to total 
liabilities, STA is the ratio of sales to total assets, SIZE is total assets divided by the consumer price index, 
CLCA is the ratio of current liabilities to current assets, OENEG is a dummy variable equal to one if total 
liabilities exceeds total assets and zero otherwise, NITA is the ratio of net income to total assets, FUTL is 
the ratio of funds from operations to total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one if net income 
was negative for the past two years and zero otherwise, and CHIN is a measure of the change in net 
income.  These variables are described in detail in the appendix.  Absolute values of z-statistics are reported 
in parentheses below coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each regression.  
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sample period: 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 1981-2008 
SIZE  -0.254              -0.208   
     (2.38)**   (1.67)*   
TLTA  20.372 14.304   
      (4.80)***       (3.54)***   
WCTA    0.068  -0.348   
 (0.09) (0.63)   
CLCA  -0.002 -0.112   
  (1.88)* (0.51)   
NITA    6.441   7.126   
 (0.35) (0.35)   
FUTL -8.076   -8.044   
              (1.15) (1.07)   
CHIN  -0.300  -0.355   
              (1.31) (1.37)   
INCDUM  0.905  0.600   
      (2.76)*** (1.65)*   
TEDUM  1.095 0.904   
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WCTA     0.815 0.203 
                (0.77) (0.24) 
RETA    -2.453 -0.530 
        (2.28)** (0.44) 
EBITA    -24.779 -22.096 
      (1.78)* (1.61) 
METL     -2.947 -1.737 
         (3.31)***    (2.52)** 
STA    28.703 30.320 
   (1.32) (1.46) 
SPREAD  15.011  20.168 
                                                                              (4.02)***         (5.20)*** 
CONSTANT -11.409 -9.640 -2.977 -4.291 
         (6.70)***      (6.29)***      (9.65)***       (8.87)*** 
Observations 6349 6349 5896 5896 
Bankruptcies 51 51 48 48 
Pseudo R2 0.245 0.324 0.179 0.277 
Sample Type Firms with Bonds Firms with  Bonds Firms with Bonds Firms with Bonds 
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Table 3.7: Bankruptcy Prediction – All Covariates 
 
Table 3.7 reports results from logit regressions of the bankruptcy indicator on predictor variables.   The 
explanatory variables are all the covariates described in Tables 5 and 6. Absolute values of z-statistics are 
reported in parentheses next to coefficient estimates.  McFadden pseudo R2 values are reported for each 
regression.  Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
Sample period: 1981-2008 1981-2008 
NIMTAAVG 31.04 (1.48) 44.82    (1.89)* 
TLMTA 1.39 (0.12)   4.89 (0.38) 
EXRETAVG -12.93       (2.81)*** -13.98       (2.90)*** 
SIGMA -0.05 (0.04) -1.08 (0.79) 
RSIZE -0.89      (2.47)** -1.15       (3.09)*** 
CASHMTA -6.09          (1.40) -8.31 (1.43) 
MB -0.44      (2.28)** -0.47     (2.31)** 
PRICE -0.06 (0.12)  0.07 (0.12) 
DD -0.31 (1.49) -0.37 (1.52) 
RATING 0.09 (0.86) -0.04 (0.33) 
SIZE  0.82     (2.44)**  1.00       (3.03)*** 
TLTA  -10.48 (0.29) -30.15 (0.71) 
WCTA  0.29 (0.30) -0.17 (0.17) 
CLCA  0.14 (0.65) -0.09 (0.29) 
NITA  -14.29 (1.19) -19.27 (1.35) 
FUTL -2.35 (0.50) -1.84 (0.32) 
CHIN  -0.42    (1.66)* -0.37 (1.38) 
INCDUM  0.82    (1.77)* 0.77 (1.52) 
TEDUM  2.55         (3.28)*** 3.05       (3.45)*** 
RETA  1.75          (1.06) 1.53 (0.42) 
EBITA  -1.99 (0.11) -10.74 (0.57) 
STA -0.37 (0.35) -1.38 (0.89) 
METL  40.10 (1.55) 48.21   (1.68)* 
SPREAD   17.97       (3.59)*** 
CONSTANT -14.53 (0.66) -10.57 (1.11) 
Observations 5175 5175 
Bankruptcies 43 43 
Pseudo R2 .415 .455 
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Table 3.8: Firm characteristics in credit-spread portfolios 
 
In Table 3.8 we report firm characteristics such as that month’s equity return, market capitalization (in 
$millions), book to market value, momentum and firm beta for three credit-spread portfolios. Each month 
from January 1981 through December 2008, value-weighted credit spread portfolios are formed from all 
stocks with available bond data using CRSP returns. Firms must also have Compustat data to calculate 
book-to-market values. Size is the market value of equity in millions of dollars and is taken from CRSP as 
the product of share price at the end of the month and the number of shares outstanding. Book-to-market 
(BM) is calculated as the ratio of book equity in the previous calendar month to market equity in the 
previous month for all stocks with Compustat data as well as credit spread information. Book equity value 
used in that month must have been available to the public for a minimum of 6 months. Previous return is 
the compounded raw returns of the past 12 months. We calculate each firm's beta for month t by regressing 
each stock's monthly returns on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index during the past 36 months. Beta is 
the regression coefficient on the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX index. 
 
 
Spread Rank Variable Mean Std Dev 
Return 0.00986 0.0655 
Size 26,237 64,575 
BM 0.48695 0.30274 
Prev Return 0.17002 0.24911 
Low 
Beta 0.93860 0.48353 
Return 0.01307 0.07279 
Size 14,130 46449 
BM 0.61622 0.42316 
Prev Return 0.17671 0.27025 
Intermediate 
Beta 0.98480 0.49288 
Return 0.01359 0.10542 
Size 5,927 21647 
BM 0.83271 0.64552 
Prev Return 0.15031 0.40985 
High 
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Table 3.9: Monthly equity returns for credit spread portfolios 
 
In Table 3.9 we report CAPM and 4-factor regression results for distress portfolios. We sort stocks into 
deciles each January from 1981 through December 2008, according to their credit spreads obtained at the 
beginning of December of the most recent year ended. We compute the value-weighted return for these 
decile portfolios on a monthly basis and regress the portfolio return in excess of risk-free rate on the market 
(MKT), size (SMB), value (HML), and momentum (MOM) factors. The factors are obtained from Ken 
French’s website. The results under ‘Bond Spreads’ on the left hand side use credit spreads calculated as 
the difference between the corporate bond yield and the corresponding maturity matched treasury rate. The 
results under ‘Bond Spreads In Excess of Expected Losses’ on the right hand side use credit spreads that 
are net of expected losses. The ‘Bond Spread’ variable is a measure of the total default risk while the ‘Bond 
Spreads In Excess of Expected Losses’ proxy for only the systematic portion of default risk. We report 
regression results for only the top and bottom decile portfolios to save space.  Absolute values of t-statistics 
are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 











Monthly Equity Returns For Default Risk Portfolios 
Bond Spreads    Bond Spreads In Excess of Expected Losses 
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM      Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM  
10th   0.094            10th   0.090          
  (1.43)              (1.36)          
  -0.316     0.843             -0.321     0.841        
  (0.16) (22.64)***            (0.08) (22.21)***        
  -0.421     0.882 -0.35 -0.04 -0.02       -0.420    0.886   -0.342 -0.018  -0.023  
  (0.38) (22.61)*** (6.78)** (0.66) (0.44)      (0.25) (22.22)***  ( 6.59)*** (0.29) (0.62)  
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM      Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM  
90th   0.223            90th   0.311          
  (0.49)              (0.69)          
   -0.233     1.063            -0.140     1.055        
  (0.65) (13.39)***            (0.39) (13.18)***        
  -0.629     1.272     0.432   0.976 -0.148      -0.576     1.278   0.416     1.008 -0.124  
  (1.88)* (15.68)***  ( 4.10)***  (7.89)*** (1.96)**      (1.72)* (15.79)*** (3.95)***   ( 8.16)*** (1.65)*  
  Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM      Alpha * 100 MKT SMB HML MOM  
90th - 10th  0.129        90th - 10th  0.221          
  (0.05)          (0.05)          
   0.083   0.477         -0.181   0.048        
  (0.70) (8.85)***         (0.69)  (6.67)***        
  -0.208  0.516  -0.063   0.109 -0.025      -0.156   0.219   0.605    0.863 -0.181  
  (0.79) (6.56)*** (0.62) (0.91) (0.35)      (0.84)  (6.50)***  (0.70)   (1.03) (0.10)  
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Table 3.10: Monthly equity returns for bond liquidity / credit spread portfolios 
 
In Table 3.10, we report one month ahead equity returns of credit-spread sorted portfolios for companies 
associated with different levels of bond market liquidity. We separately report equity returns for companies 
that are associated with high liquidity in the bond market as well as for companies that are associated with 
low liquidity in the bond market. In order to determine a bond’s market liquidity level we use 4 proxies as 
described in the text. A dummy variable is given each month a value of one or zero depending on the 
characteristics of the underlying bond.  We then add up the dummy variables to come up with an overall 
liquidity score for each bond.  We value weight the liquidity scores of the bonds that belong to the same 
firm and assign each firm a single bond market liquidity measure in a given month. Weights are the 
outstanding market values of the bonds. In a similar fashion we calculate firm level credit spreads for each 
firm on a monthly basis. Every month, we group firms into three buckets based on their bond market 
liquidity level.  Furthermore, within each bond market liquidity bucket, firms are grouped in to three 
portfolios based on their value weighted credit spreads. For each liquidity bucket we report uniformly 
ranked monthly raw returns for the three credit-spread portfolios, as well as raw return differences, CAPM 
and 4-factor Carhart model based monthly alphas between high credit spread and low credit spread 




Bond Liquidity Rank Spread Rank Avg Return t-stat 
L 0.8600    3.29*** 
2 1.1900    3.82*** 
H 1.0700     2.86*** 
Raw    Alpha H-L 0.0500 0.22 
CAPM Alpha H-L -0.0810 -0.34 
High 
Carhart Alpha H-L -0.0290 0.14 
L 0.7000   2.51** 
2 0.5400  1.78* 
H 0.9800    2.51** 
Raw    Alpha H-L 0.1388   0.54  
CAPM Alpha H-L 0.0200  0.08 
Intermediate 
Carhart Alpha H-L 0.0165    0.069 
L 1.0537      4.10*** 
2 1.0570      3.73*** 
H 0.9353     2.49** 
Raw    Alpha H-L -0.1184  -0.49 
CAPM Alpha H-L -0.2260  -0.96 
Low 
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Table 3.11: Monthly equity returns for credit spread/maturity portfolios 
 
In Table 3.11, we report returns of credit-spread sorted portfolios in different time-to-maturity groups. 
Maturity is the remaining time to maturity in years of the bonds. We allocate each bond to one of four 
maturity groups: Bucket 1 includes bonds with maturities less than 4 years but more than 1 year, Bucket 2 
includes bonds with maturities greater than 4 years but less than 7 years, Bucket 3 includes bonds with 
maturities greater than 7 years but less than 11 years, and Bucket 4 includes bonds with maturities greater 
than 11 years. Each month from January 1981 through December 2008 bonds are assigned to four groups 
based on their time to maturity. For each firm we calculate four different credit-spread values: one for each 
maturity bucket.  All credit spreads are value-weighted with respect to the market values of a firm’s 
outstanding bonds. If a firm doesn’t have any bonds outstanding in a given maturity bucket then it is 
excluded from the analysis regarding that time to maturity group. Within each maturity bucket firms are 
assigned to three portfolios based on their credit spreads. For each time-to-maturity bucket we calculate 
equal-weighted subsequent realized monthly equity returns for each credit-spread portfolio. In each 
maturity bucket we ask whether portfolios with high credit spread have unusually high or low returns 
relative to the predictions of standard asset pricing models such as the CAPM, and the four-factor Carhart 
model. We report uniformly ranked monthly raw returns for the three credit-risk portfolios, as well as raw 
return differences, CAPM and 4-factor Carhart model based monthly alphas between high credit spread and 
low credit spread portfolios. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
 
Maturity Groups spread -rank       Mean      t-value 
 Maturity-Bucket 1 L 1.0268     3.45*** 
  2 1.2140     3.56*** 
               H 1.0767     2.70*** 
1<=TTM<=4 Raw    Alpha H-L 0.0599 0.21 
  CAPM Alpha H-L -0.0330 -0.12 
  Carhart Alpha H-L -0.0960 -0.41 
 Maturity-Bucket 2 L 0.8629   2.35* 
  2 0.8320      2.94***  
               H 0.8400     3.53*** 
4<TTM<=7 Raw    Alpha H-L -0.0229 0.00 
  CAPM Alpha H-L -0.1590 -0.69 
  Carhart Alpha H-L -0.0730 -0.36 
Maturity-Bucket 3 L 0.8700     3.46*** 
  2 0.8600     2.88*** 
               H 0.9499    2.47** 
7<TTM<=11 Raw    Alpha H-L 0.0799  0.02  
  CAPM Alpha H-L -0.1510 -0.62 
  Carhart Alpha H-L -0.1370 -0.60 
Maturity-Bucket 4 L 0.8700     3.25*** 
  2 1.0200     3.47*** 
  H 0.9678    2.54** 
11<TTM Raw    Alpha H-L 0.0978 0.39 
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  CAPM Alpha H-L -0.0370 -0.15 
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Chapter IV 
 
Affect in a Behavioral Asset Pricing Model 
 
 
 We admire a stock or despise it when we hear its name, whether Google or General 
Motors, before we think about its price-to-earnings ratio or the growth of its company’s 
sales.  Stocks, like houses, cars, watches and most other products exude affect, good or 
bad, beautiful or ugly, admired or despised. Slovic, Finucane, Peters, and MacGregor 
(2002) described affect, the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness,’ as a feeling that 
occurs rapidly and automatically, often without consciousness. Zajonc (1980), an early 
proponent of the importance of affect in decision making wrote, “We do not just see 
house: We see a handsome house, an ugly house, or a pretentious house” (p. 154) and 
added “We sometimes delude ourselves that we proceed in a rational manner and weigh 
all the pros and cons of the various alternatives.  But this is rarely the case.  Quite often ‘I 
decided in favor of X’ is no more than “I liked X’. We buy the cars we ‘like,” choose the 
jobs and houses we find ‘attractive,’ and then justify these choices by various reasons.” 
(p. 155) Kahneman (2002) described the affect heuristic in his Nobel Prize Lecture as 
“probably the most important development in the study of judgment heuristics in the last 
decades.” 
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 Affect plays a role in pricing models of houses, cars and watches but, according to 
standard financial theory, affect plays no role in pricing of financial assets. Expected 
returns in the CAPM are determined by risk alone, measured by beta, and, according to 
Fama and French (1992), market capitalization and book-to-market ratios in their 3-factor 
asset pricing model of risk. But affect plays a role in behavioral asset pricing models 
where we know it as ‘sentiment’ or as an ‘expressive’ set of characteristics.  
 Statman (1999) described a behavioral asset-pricing model that includes utilitarian 
factors, such as risk, but also expressive or affect characteristics, such as the negative 
affect of tobacco and other ‘sin’ companies or the positive affect of prestigious hedge 
funds. He illustrated the model with an analogy to the watch market.  A $10,000 Rolex 
watch and a $50 Timex watch have approximately the same utilitarian qualities; both 
watches display the same time. But Rolex buyers are willing to pay an extra $9,950 over 
the price of the Timex because of the affect of a Rolex, consisting of prestige, and 
perhaps beauty, is more positive than that of a Timex.  
 Asset pricing models are intertwined with the efficient market hypothesis, but our 
paper is about asset pricing models, not market efficiency.  We find that the returns of 
stocks admired by respondents of the Fortune surveys were lower than the returns of less 
admired stocks, but we do not claim to have uncovered a new anomaly.  Rather, we 
hypothesize that affect plays a role in pricing models of financial assets. In particular, we 
hypothesize that affect underlies the market capitalization and book-to-market factors of 
the 3-factor models. We find evidence consistent with our hypothesis, and outline a 
behavioral asset pricing model.   
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4.1 Affect in pricing models 
 There is considerable evidence that affect plays a role in pricing.  For example, Hsee 
(1998) presented to subjects pictures of two ice cream cups, depicted in Figure 4.1.  The 
cup of ice cream on the left contains 8 ounces of ice cream but its affect is negative since 
it seems stingy in its 10-ounce cup.  In contrast, the affect of the 7 ounces of ice cream on 
the right is positive since it is overflowing its 6-ounce cup.  Hsee found that subjects who 
saw only one of the ice cream cups were willing to pay a higher price for the 7 ounces of 
ice cream with positive affect than for the 8 ounces of ice cream with negative affect.  
But subjects who saw the two cups side by side were willing to pay a higher price for the 
cup with 8 ounces of ice cream. 
 Affect is an emotion and, like all emotions, it is grounded in evolutionary psychology. 
Cosmides and Tooby (2000) wrote that evolutionary psychology is a theoretical 
framework that combines principles and results from evolutionary biology, cognitive 
science, anthropology and neuroscience to describe human behavior. They described 
emotions as programs whose function is to direct the activities and interactions of sub-
programs, including those of perception, attention, goal choice, and physiological 
reactions. Cosmides and Tooby illustrated with the emotion of fear, as when stalked by 
predators. “Goals and motivational weightings change; Safety becomes a far higher 
priority…You are no longer hungry; you cease to think about how to charm a potential 
mate… adrenalin spikes…” (p.    ) 
 Emotions prevent us from being lost in thought when it is time to act. But sometimes 
emotions subvert good thinking. Reliance on emotions increases with the complexity of 
information and with stress. Shiv and Fedorikhin (1999) described an experiment where 
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subjects chose between a chocolate cake with intense positive affect but inferior from a 
cognitive perspective, and a fruit salad with a less positive affect but superior from a 
cognitive perspective. One group of subjects was assigned a low-stress task, memorizing 
a two-digit number, while another was assigned a higher-stress task, memorizing a seven-
digit number. Next, subjects were asked to walk over to another room. On their way each 
could choose a chocolate cake or a fruit salad. Shiv and Fedorikhin found that subjects 
who were under the greater stress of memorizing the seven-digit number were more 
likely to be guided by affect and choose the chocolate cake over the fruit salad. 
 Stocks are notoriously complex and their evaluation is stressful. Are shares of Google 
at $700 per share better investments than shares of General Motors at $20 per share? 
Investors try to overcome the pull of affect through a systematic examination of relevant 
information, but affect still exerts its power.  
 Internet related dotcom names had positive affect in the boom years of the late 1990s 
and Cooper et al (2001) found that companies that changed their names to dotcom names 
had positive abnormal returns on the order of 74% in the 10 days surrounding the 
announcement day, even when nothing about their business has changed. Dotcom names 
acquired negative affect in the bust years of the early 2000s and Cooper et al (2005) 
found that companies that changed their dotcom names to conventional names during that 
time experienced positive abnormal returns once more. 
  The findings of Cooper et al are examples of ‘integral affect.’  This is affect that is 
associated with the characteristics of a particular object, such as a stock. ‘Incidental 
affect’ is different from integral affect in that it arises not from an object but from an 
unrelated event. For example, Welch (1999) induced fear in subjects by showing them 
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two minutes of Kubrick’s movie “The Shining.” He found that the fear they induced 
carried over beyond the movie, increasing subjects’ risk aversion in choices unrelated to 
the movie.  In the context of stocks, Hirshleifer and Shumway (2003) found that the 
positive incidental affect of sunny days brought high stock returns, and Edmans et al 
(2007) found that the negative incidental affect of soccer losses brought low stock 
returns. 
 The immediate effect of an increase in affect is an increase in stock prices but higher 
stock prices set the stage for lower future returns.  This long term effect is evident in 
Hong and Kacperczyk’s (2007) study of ‘sin’ stocks, namely those of tobacco, alcohol 
and gaming companies.  The negative affect of sin companies is reflected in social norms 
against vice.  Hong and Kacperczyk found that stocks of sin companies had abnormal 
positive returns during the1926 to 2004 time period. We hypothesize that the negative 
affect of despised companies in the Fortune surveys underlies their higher stock returns, 
analogous to the higher returns sin company stocks. 
 
4.2 Market efficiency and asset pricing models 
 Fama (1970) noted that market efficiency per se is not testable.  Market efficiency 
must be tested jointly with an asset pricing model, such as the CAPM or the three-factor 
model.  For example, the excess returns relative to the CAPM of small-cap stocks and 
stocks with high book-to-market ratios might indicate that the market is not efficient or 
that the CAPM is a bad model of expected returns. But when it comes to tests of market 
efficiency the CAPM is quite different from the three-factor model.  
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  The CAPM presents expected returns as a function of objective risk. The objective 
measure of investment risk is based on the probability distribution of investment 
outcomes, usually equated with the variance of a portfolio and the beta of a security 
within a portfolio. In contrast, the three-factor model presents expected returns as 
functions of beta, a measure of objective risk, but also as functions of market 
capitalization and book-to-market ratios. But what do market capitalization and book-to-
market ratios represent? Fama and French argued that they represent objective risk but 
much of the evidence is inconsistent with their argument. For example, Lakonishok et al 
(1994) found that value stocks outperformed growth stocks in three out of four recessions 
during 1963-1990, inconsistent with the view that value stock are riskier. Similarly, 
Skinner and Sloan (2002) found that the relatively high returns of value stocks are not 
due to their higher risk. Rather, they are due to large declines in the prices of growth 
stocks in response to negative earnings surprises. We present 4-factor analysis of the data 
here for its insights into assets pricing models, not as a test of market efficiency. 
 
4.3 Fortune admired and despised 
 Fortune magazine has been publishing the results of an annual survey of company 
reputations since 1983.  The survey published in March 2007 included 587 companies.  
Fortune asked more than 10,000 senior executives, directors and security analysts who 
responded to the survey to rate the ten largest companies in their industries on eight 
attributes of reputation, using a scale of zero (poor) to ten (excellent). We focus on the 
attribute of Long-Term Investment Value (LTIV) since it reflects perceptions of 
respondents about company stocks, incorporating both their expected returns and risk.  
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 Consider two portfolios constructed by Fortune scores, each consisting of an equally 
weighted half of the Fortune stocks.  The Admired portfolio contains the stocks of 
companies with the highest LTIV scores and the Despised portfolio contains the stocks 
with the lowest scores.  If Fortune respondents believe that the stock market is efficient 
we should expect that they would rate all stock equally on LTIV. This is because in an 
efficient market there are no stocks with high LTIV and no stocks with low LTIV. If 
Fortune respondents believe that the stock market is inefficient and they can indeed 
identify correctly the stocks with higher LTIV, we should expect that stocks of 
companies with high LTIV would do better than stocks of companies with low LTIV. But 
this is not what we find. We argue that ratings of LTIV serves as a measure of affect. 
Fortune respondents rate some stocks high on LTIV and other stocks low because they 
are influenced by the positive affect of the first group and the negative affect of the other. 
 We construct the portfolios on September 30, 1982, based on the Fortune survey 
published subsequently in 1983.  This is because Fortune surveys are completed by 
respondents around September 30th of the year before they are published.   
Fortune does not define how long long-term is.  We investigate three horizons, 2, 3, and 4 
years.  For the 2-year horizon we reconstituted each portfolio on September 30th every 
two years, so the first reconstitution is based on the survey conducted in 1984 and 
published in 1985.  We constructed portfolios similarly for the 3 and 4-year horizons.  
Fortunately, our overall 24-year period, September 30th 1982 – September 30th 2006 is 
divisible by all three periods so each time period is included in each analysis. 
The mean scores of companies in some industries, such as the 6.43 of the Communication 
industry, are higher on average than those of other industries, such as the 5.14 of the Coal 
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Mining industry. We calculate the mean score of companies in each industry in the 
surveys published in 1983-2007 surveys and define the industry-adjusted score of a 
company as the difference between its score in a given survey and the mean score of 
companies in its industry.  
 The returns of the Despised portfolios exceeded those of the Admired portfolios.  For 
example, the mean annualized return of the Despised portfolio during September 30, 
1982 – September 30, 2006 was 19.72% when the portfolio was rebalanced every four 
years, higher than the 15.12% mean annualized return of the Admired portfolio (see table 
4.1) 
 The advantage of the Despised portfolios over the Admired portfolios remains intact 
when we assess them by the CAPM.  The alphas of the Despised portfolios are 
consistently higher than those of their respective Admired portfolios.  For example, the 
annualized alpha of the Despised portfolio when portfolios are reconstituted every four 
years is 4.89% while it is only 1.57% in the Admired portfolio.  The alphas of Despised 
portfolios are positive and statistically significant in all reconstitution intervals.  The 
alphas of the Admired portfolios are always positive but statistically significant only in 
the 3-year reconstitution interval.  
 
4.4 Characteristics of despised and admired portfolios 
 A 4-factor analysis, presented in Table 4.2, shows that companies in the Despised 
portfolios have higher objective risk than companies in the Admired portfolios. Betas in 
the Despised portfolios are consistently higher than betas in the respective Admired 
portfolios. The 4-factor analysis also shows that the characteristics of small, value and 
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low short-term momentum are associated with the Despised portfolios. The tilts of the 
Despised portfolios toward small and value are consistently greater than those of the 
respective Admired portfolios and the momentum of the Despised portfolios is 
consistently lower than that of the Admired portfolios. Further analysis presented in 
Table 4.3 shows that companies in the Despised portfolios also had higher earnings-to-
price ratios, higher cash-flows-to-price ratios, lower past sales and earnings growth and 
lower returns on assets. 
 
4.5 Affect in a behavioral asset pricing model 
 The behavioral asset pricing model we outline is one where expected returns are high 
when objective risk is high and also when subjective risk is high. High subjective risk 
comes with negative affect and low subjective risk comes with positive affect.  
 Subjective risk is different from objective risk. For example, Ganzach (2000) 
presented a list of 30 international stock markets to two groups of subjects.  One group 
was asked to judge the expected returns of the market portfolios of each stock market, 
while the other group was asked to judge the risk of these market portfolios. A CAPM-
like asset pricing model based entirely on objective risk would lead us to expect a 
positive correlation between assessments of risk and assessments of expected returns but 
Ganzach found a negative correlation; markets with high expected returns were perceived 
to have low risk. 
 The negative relationship between subjective risk and expected returns in Ganzach’s 
study is one example of a general negative relationship between subjective risk and 
perceived benefits. Slovic et al (2002) attribute that negative relationship to the halo of 
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affect. When affect is positive benefits are judged high and risk is judged low. And when 
affect is negative benefits are judged low and risk high. We find similar results in our 
experiments. 
 In the first experiment, conducted in May 2007, we asked investors, high net-worth 
clients of an investment company, to complete a questionnaire listing only the names of 
210 companies from the Fortune 2007 survey, their industries, and a 10-point scale 
ranging from “bad” to “good”. The questionnaire said:  “Look at the name of the 
company and its industry and quickly rate the feeling associated with it on a scale ranging 
from bad to good.  Don’t spend time thinking about the rating.  Just go with your quick, 
intuitive feeling.”  The affect score of a company is the mean score assigned to it by the 
surveyed investors.  We found a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
affect scores and Fortune scores (see Figure 4.2). 
 In the second experiment, conducted in July 2007 we presented to another group of 
investors the names and industries of the same 210 companies from the Fortune 2007 
survey. One group of investors was asked to rate the future return of each stock on a 10-
point scale ranging from low to high. Another group of investors was asked to rate the 
risk of each stock on the same scale. The risk and return scores of companies are the 
mean scores assigned to them by the surveyed investors.   
 If investors’ assessment of risk reflects objective risk alone we should find a positive 
correlation between the risk scores and the return scores they assigned to companies. 
However, as seen in Figure 4.3, we find a negative correlation between the two; high 
return scores correspond to low risk score. This negative correlation indicates that 
investors assessments of risk reflect subjective risk associated with affect. Affect creates 
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a halo over stocks. Stocks with positive affect are assessed high in future returns and low 
in risk, and stocks with negative affect are assessed low in future returns and high in risk.  
 We also find a link between return scores, risk scores, and Fortune scores. In a 
regression of Fortune scores on return scores we find that high Fortune ratings are 
associated with high return scores. The coefficient of the return scores is positive and 
statistically significant. Similarly, in a regression of Fortune scores on risk scores we find 
that high Fortune ratings are associated with low risk scores. The coefficient of the risk 
scores is negative and statistically significant (see Figures 4.4 and 4.5). 
 Objective risk measured by beta and subjective risk measured by affect are two factors 
in the behavioral asset pricing model. But they are not alone. Momentum is an especially 
interesting factor since its rationale is distinct from the rationale of affect.  
Objective risk measured by beta and subjective risk measured by affect are two factors in 
the behavioral asset pricing model. But they are not alone. Short-term  momentum is an 
especially interesting factor since its rationale is distinct from the rationale of affect.  
Short-term (12-month) momentum is positively correlated with affect, yet it is generally 
associated with high returns (Jagadeesh and Titman (1993)). In contrast, market 
capitalization which is also positively correlated with affect is generally associated with 
low returns. This suggests that the association between short-term momentum and returns 
is not due to the role of short-term momentum as a proxy for affect. Indeed, the 
association between short-term momentum and returns has been attributed by Grinblatt 
and Han (2005) to the “disposition effect,” described by Shefrin and Statman (1985) and 
by Sias (2007) to trading by institutional investors.  
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4.6 Investor preferences and stock returns 
 The road from the perception that admired companies offer both high expected returns 
and low risk to the low realized returns of such stocks is not straight, as explained by 
Shefrin and Statman (1995) and more recently by Pontiff (2006).  Suppose that typical 
investors prefer admired companies they perceive as having both high expected returns 
and low risk. But surely some investors are ‘contrarians,’ aware of the preferences of 
typical investors and seek capitalize on them by favoring stocks of despised companies.  
Would arbitrage by contrarians not nullify any effect of typical investors on stock 
returns?  Subjective risk stemming from affect plays no role in the asset pricing model if 
the effects of typical investors on stock returns are nullified by arbitrage. However, 
subjective risk plays a role in the asset pricing model if arbitrage is incomplete. 
 As we consider arbitrage and the likelihood that it would nullify the effects of the 
preferences of typical investors on stock returns we should note that no perfect (risk-free) 
arbitrage is possible here. As some hedge funds and other unlucky investors found out, 
price gaps that are likely to close over a long period might widen further over a shorter 
period. To see the implications of imperfect arbitrage, imagine contrarians who know that 
stocks of despised companies have high expected returns relative to their objective risk. It 
is optimal for contrarians to increase their holdings of stocks of despised companies, but 
as the amount devoted to such stocks increases, the portfolios of contrarians become less 
diversified and they take on more idiosyncratic risk. The increase in portfolio risk leads 
contrarians to limit the amount allocated to despised stocks, and with it, limit their effect 
on stock returns.    
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4.7 Conclusion 
 All asset pricing models, whether of securities, cars or watches, are versions of the 
basic demand and supply model where prices are determined by the intersection of 
demand and supply. The demand and supply functions reflect the preferences of 
consumers and producers. 
 The demand and supply structure is evident in the CAPM. In that model investors on 
both the demand and supply sides prefer mean-variance-efficient portfolios and the 
aggregation of their preferences yields an asset pricing model where expected returns of 
securities vary by beta. The demand and supply structure is not nearly as evident in the 
Fama and French 3-factor asset pricing model. Market capitalization and book-to-market 
ratios were associated with anomalies relative to the CAPM long before their debut in the 
3-factor model, but the argument that market capitalization and book-to-market ratios 
proxy for risk is not fully supported by the evidence.  
 The purpose of this paper is to help link asset pricing models to the preferences of 
investors. We outline a behavioral asset pricing model where expected returns are high 
when objective risk is high and also when subjective risk is high. High subjective risk 
comes with negative affect and low subjective risk comes with positive affect. Affect is 
the specific quality of ‘goodness’ or ‘badness.’ It is a feeling that occurs rapidly and 
automatically, often without consciousness. Investors prefer stocks with positive affect 
and their preference boosts the prices of stocks with positive affect and depresses their 
returns. 
 We study the preferences of investors as reflected in surveys conducted by Fortune 
magazine during 1983- 2006 and additional surveys we conducted in 2007. We find that 
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the returns of admired stocks, those highly rated by the Fortune respondents, were lower 
than the returns of despised stocks, those rated low. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that stocks with negative affect have high subjective risk and their extra returns 
compensate for that risk. We also find that market capitalization and book-to-market 
ratios are correlated with affect and argue that they proxy for it. 
 We find additional evidence consistent with the hypothesis in our own surveys. 
Respondents in our surveys rate companies as if they believe that stocks with high 
expected returns also have low risk and perceive stocks of companies admired by Fortune 
respondents as having both high expected returns and low risk.  
We emphasize that the behavioral asset pricing model we outline is not superior to the 3 
or 4-factor models. Indeed, the 3 and 4-facor models are behavioral models under their 
standard-finance skins. The affect factor in the behavioral asset pricing model elucidated 
the rationale underlying the market cap and book-to-market factors of the 3-factor model. 
The number of factors in a full model is likely to grow to include factors such as liquidity 
that are not included in our behavioral model or in the 3 and 4-factor models. Moreover, 
affect has several distinct sources and these sources might play distinct roles in a 
behavioral asset pricing model. Social responsibility is one source of positive affect, and 
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Table 4.1: CAPM-based performance of Admired and Despised portfolios 
 
September of every second, third and fourth year from 1982 to 2006, we form two portfolios based on the 
‘overall reputation’ score of each company in the Fortune survey. The ‘Admired’ portfolio contains all the 
companies ranked highest and the ‘Despised’ portfolio contains all the companies ranked lowest based on 
their scores each year.  In forming portfolios, we adjust the overall company scores for industry differences.  
The adjusted score is computed by subtracting the average industry score from each individual company’s 
score for the industry to which the company belongs.  The first two digits of the SIC code is used for 
industry classification in computing the average industry scores  We then calculate equally weighted 
returns for the two portfolios from March of year t to September of year t+2, t+3 and t+4. Companies 
delisted during the holding period are assigned their delisting return and removed from the portfolio next 
month.  In this table we report CAPM alphas for the two portfolios for the t+2, t+3 and t+4 holding periods 
.  t-statistics are reported in below coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 Despised Admired Difference 
Portfolios reconstituted every 2 years.   
    




Annualized Alpha 4.37% 1.94% 2.43% 
t-stat 2.43** 1.67*   
Market 1.04 0.98 0.06 
t-stat 30.84*** 44.82***   
Adj R^2 0.76 0.87   
    
Portfolios reconstituted every 3 years.   




Annualized Alpha 3.81% 2.29% 1.52% 
t-stat 2.17** 1.95*   
Market 1.03 1.00 0.04 
t-stat 31.24*** 44.58***   
Adj R^2 0.77 0.87   
    
Portfolios reconstituted every 4 years.   
    




Annualized Alpha 4.89% 1.57% 3.32% 
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t-stat 2.82*** 1.31   
Market 1.03 0.98 0.05 
t-stat 31.66*** 42.96***   
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Table 4.2: 4-factor-based performance of Admired and Despised portfolios 
 
September of every second, third and fourth year from 1982 to 2006, we form two portfolios based on the 
‘overall reputation’ score of each company in the Fortune survey. The ‘Admired’ portfolio contains all the 
companies ranked highest and the ‘Despised’ portfolio contains all the companies ranked lowest based on 
their scores each year.  In forming portfolios, we adjust the overall company scores for industry differences.  
The adjusted score is computed by subtracting the average industry score from each individual company’s 
score for the industry to which the company belongs.  The first two digits of the SIC code is used for 
industry classification in computing the average industry scores  We then calculate equally weighted 
returns for the two portfolios from March of year t to September of year t+2, t+3 and t+4. Companies 
delisted during the holding period are assigned their delisting return and removed from the portfolio next 
month.  In this table we report 4-factor alphas for the two portfolios for the t+2, t+3 and t+4 holding periods 
.  t-statistics are reported in below coefficient estimates. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
 
 Despised Portfolio Admired Portfolio Difference 
    
Portfolios reconstituted every 2 years.   
 4-Factor Based Performance2 
Annualized Alpha 1.90% 0.35% 1.55% 
t-stat 1.55 0.36   
Market 1.18 1.09 0.09 
t-stat 45.75*** 53.61***   
Small-minus-Big 0.36 -0.05 0.41 
t-stat 11.25*** -1.99***   
Value-minus-Growth 0.59 0.29 0.29 
t-stat 15.26*** 9.66***   
Momentum -0.24 -0.09 -0.15 
t-stat -10.60*** -4.95***   
Adj R^2 0.90 0.92   
    
Portfolios reconstituted every 3 years.   
 4-Factor Based Performance2 
Annualized Alpha 1.29% 0.81% 0.48% 
t-stat 1.04 0.83   
Market 1.17 1.10 0.06 
t-stat 44.60*** 54.08***   
Small-minus-Big 0.35 -0.04 0.39 
t-stat 10.81*** -1.46   
Value-minus-Growth 0.57 0.30 0.26 
t-stat 14.54*** 9.95***   
Momentum -0.22 -0.11 -0.11 
t-stat -9.53*** -5.94***   
Adj R^2 0.89 0.92   
    
Portfolios reconstituted every 4 years.   
 4-Factor Based Performance2 
Annualized Alpha 2.07% -0.02% 2.09% 
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t-stat 1.64 -0.03   
Market 1.17 1.09 0.08 
t-stat 44.18*** 52.01***   
Small-minus-Big 0.32 -0.02 0.34 
t-stat 9.70*** -0.96   
Value-minus-Growth 0.57 0.32 0.25 
t-stat 14.42*** 10.11***   
Momentum -0.19 -0.11 -0.09 
t-stat -8.25*** -5.72***   
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Table 4.3: Characteristics of stocks in admired and despised portfolios 
 
September of each year, we form two portfolios based on the ‘overall reputation’ score of each company in 
the Fortune survey. The ‘Admired’ portfolio contains all the companies ranked highest and the ‘Despised’ 
portfolio contains all the companies ranked lowest based on their scores each year.  In forming portfolios, 
we adjust the overall company scores for industry differences.  The adjusted score is computed by 
subtracting the average industry score from each individual company’s score for the industry to which the 
company belongs.  The first two digits of the SIC code is used for industry classification in computing the 
average industry scores.    In this table we report average characteristics of stocks in each portfolio. 
1Market capitalization is at the end of September of the portfolio formation year. Book equity (defined as 
in Davis, Fama, French 2000) at the end of the fiscal year prior to portfolio formation and price at the end 
of September of the portfolio formation year. Earnings are in the fiscal year prior to portfolio formation and 
price at the end of September of the portfolio formation year. Cash flow (Earnings + Depreciation) in the 
fiscal year prior to portfolio formation and price at the end of September of the portfolio formation year. 
These ratios are set to zero if they are negative. Sales growth is log change in sales in the two fiscal years 
prior to the end of September of the portfolio formation year. Earnings growth is log change in earnings in 
the two fiscal years prior to the end of September of the portfolio formation year.  Return on Assets (ROA) 




Mean Values as of September 30 of each year, 1982 - 
2005. 
 
Stocks in the Admired 
Portfolio 
Stocks in the Despised 
Portfolio 
Returns in the previous year 21.57% 11.06% 
Returns in the previous 3 years 81.24% 38.47% 
Returns in the previous 5 years 169.44% 79.50% 
Market Capitalization ($ millions)
1
 19,327 5,853 
Book-to-Market ratio 0.491 0.751 
Earnings-to-Price ratio 0.066 0.079 
Cash-Flow-to-Price ratio 0.103 0.136 
Sales Growth 0.101 0.035 
Earnings Growth 0.127 0.052 
Return on Assets 0.158 0.125 
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Expected return score =  8.4  -  0.4 Risk 
score
                                                 (-7.2)***
R2 = 0.18
n = 210
  129 





















































  130 













































Here we explain the details of the variables used to construct distress measures.  
Quarterly COMPUSTAT data is used to compute all accounting variables.  Our first 
measure is Altman z-score, which is defined as the following: 
 
z-score = 1.2 1.4 3.3 0.6 1.0 WCTA RETA EBITTA METL STA+ + + +   (A1) 
 
WCTA is the working capital (data40 – data49) divided by total assets.  We follow CHS 
2008 to adjust total assets calculated as total liabilities (data54) + market equity + 
0.1*(market equity – book equity).  Book equity is as defined in Davis, Fama, and French 
(2000). RETA is the ratio of retained earnings (data58) to total assets.  EBITTA is the ratio 
of earnings before interest and taxes (data21 - data5 + data31) to total assets, METL is the 
ratio of market equity to total liabilities, and STA is the ratio of sales (data12) to total 
assets.  Our second measure is Ohlson’s o-score, defined as: 
 
 
-score 1.32 0.407 log( ) 6.03 1.43 
0.076 1.72 2.37 1.83 
0.285 0.521 
o SIZE TLTA WCTA
CLCA OENEG NITA FUTL
INTWO CHIN
= − − + −
+ − − −
+ −
     (A2) 
 
 
where SIZE is total assets divided by the consumer price index, CLCA is the ratio of 
current liabilities (data49) to current assets (data40), OENEG is a dummy variable equal 
to one if total liabilities exceeds total assets and zero otherwise, NITA is the ratio of net 
income (data69) to total assets, FUTL is the ratio of funds from operations (data23) to 
total liabilities, INTWO is a dummy variable equal to one if net income was negative for 
the past two years and zero otherwise, and CHIN is change in net income over the last 
quarter: (NItNIt−1)/(|NIt| + |NIt−1|). 
The third measure we use is the CHS-score: 
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-   9.164 20.264 1.416 
7.129 1.411 0.045 




CHS score NIMTAAVG TLMTA
EXRETAVG SIGMA RSIZE
CASHMTA MB PRICE
= − − +
− + −
− + −
     (A3) 
 
 
where NIMTAAVG is a geometrically declining average of past values of the ratio of net 
income (data69) to total assets:  
( )
2












        (A4) 
EXRETAVG is a geometrically declining average of monthly log excess stock returns 
relative to the S&P 500 index: 













         (A5) 
The weighting coefficient is set to φ = 2−1/3, such that the weight is halved each quarter. 
TLMTA is the ratio of total liabilities (data69) to total assets.  SIGMA is the standard 
deviation of daily stock returns over the previous three months.  SIGMA is coded as 
missing if there are fewer than 5 observations.  RSIZE is the log ratio of market 
capitalization to the market value of the S&P 500 index.  CASHMTA is the ratio of the 
value of cash and short term investments (data36) to the value of total assets.  MB is the 
market-to-book ratio.  Book equity is as defined in Davis, Fama, and French (2000).  
PRICE is the log price per share truncated from above at $15. All variables are 
winsorized using a 5/95 percentile interval in order to eliminate outliers.  
We follow CHS (2008) and Hillegeist et al. (2004) to calculate our fourth distress 
measure, Merton’s distance-to-default.  The market equity value of a company is 
modeled as a call option on the company’s assets: 
  





( ) ( ) (1 )
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−∂ − −∂= − + −
+ − ∂ −
=
= −
              (A6) 
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Above 
E
V  is the market value of a firm.  
A
V  is the value of firm’s assets. X is the face 
value of debt maturing at time T.  r is the risk-free rate and ∂  is the dividend rate 
expressed in terms of 
A
V .  
A
σ  is the volatility of the value of assets, which is related to 
equity volatility through the following equation: 
 
    ( )1( ) /
T
E A A E
V e N d Vσ σ−∂=                                  (A7) 
 




σ .  We 
use the market value of equity for 
E
V and short-term plus one half long-term book debt to 
proxy for the face value of debt X  (data45+1/2*data51).  
E
σ  is the standard deviation of 
daily equity returns over the past 3 months.  T equals one year, and r is the one-year 
treasury bill rate. The dividend rate, d, is the sum of the prior year’s common and 
preferred dividends (data19 + data21) divided by the market value of assets.  We use the 
Newton method to simultaneously solve the two equations above.  For starting values for 
the unknown variables we use, 
A E
V V X= + , and ( )
A E E E
V V Xσ σ= + .    Once we 
determine asset values, 
A
V , we then compute asset returns as in Hillegeist et al. (2004): 
 
    
, , 1
, 1










 =  
  
                                  (A8) 
 
As expected returns cannot be negative, if asset returns are below zero they are set to the 












= −              (A9) 
 
                                                 
44 We obtain similar results if we use a 6% equity premium instead of asset returns as in CHS (2008). 
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